

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

Control: 8940

Rec'd: MAY 14, 1958

10:03 AM

MESSAGE CENTER
NEA
6/24
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11/13

NEA

FROM: ADEN

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 177, MAY 14, 1 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 177; REPEATED INFORMATION JIDDA 112, LONDON 84.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED MAY 14 FROM NEWSOM (THROUGH STERNER) IN TAIZ:

"AL AMRI TONIGHT REPORTED IMAM EXPRESSED DESIRE SEE ME AND REQUESTED I REMAIN ON VIEW POSSIBILITY AUDIENCE. IN VIEW INDICATIONS FROM AMRI GOY NOW SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING QUESTIONS RELEGATION AND AID I BELIEVE REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY SHOULD BE PROVIDED HIM ARRANGE AUDIENCE AND I AGREED REMAIN ADDITIONAL TWO DAYS. PLAN DRIVE ADEN MAY 16. REQUEST YOU ARRANGE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRANSPORTATION JIDDA. REPEAT THIS MESSAGE DEPARTMENT AND LONDON. INFORM JIDDA NEW ARRIVAL DATE."

FOR JIDDA: NEWSOM NOW SCHEDULED ARRIVE JIDDA ARAB AIRWAYS FLIGHT JE 008, MAY 18.

611.86H/5-1458

HBS

CRAWFORD

BB:SR

DDN

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1958 MAY 15 AM 10 54

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SENT TO: AmConsul ADEN PRIORITY 181

RPT INFO: AmEmbassy JIDDA 1586
AmEmbassy LONDON 8066

Origin

Info:

Contel 177

Following for Newsom Taiz:

You authorized inform Imam that early Yemeni reply our
legation proposal would be helpful in permitting us take initial steps
establish post with FY 58 funds. Should GOY rpt GOY find itself unable
reply prior June 1, opening Taiz Legation might be somewhat delayed until
FY 59 funds available.

Dulles
JB

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NEA:NE:WDBrewer:wdb

5/14/58

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Lampton Berry

Clearances: NEA:EX - Mr. Ryan (in draft)

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10 27
MAY 15 1958 A.M.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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FROM: Aden

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 180, May 16, 5 p.m.

Control: 11169

Rec'd: May 16, 1958
3:47 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 180; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 87

FROM NEWSON

Returned Aden May 16. Al Amri gave profuse apology and clinical explanation Imam's inability receive me but seemed appreciate courtesy of two day delay. Imam currently suffering ulcers and partial intestinal paralysis in addition rheumatism, has refused see anyone for past week, including Chinese and Pakistani Ambassadors.

Telegrams follow re aid and legation.

CRAWFORD

EAL:CK-2

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6 11.36H/5-1658

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AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

611.864/5-1658

FROM : American Consulate, Aden

177
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

May 16, 1958
DATE

REF :

S/S-2 S/P-1 C-1 G-1 REP-2 E-4

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	REC'D	OTHER
	71EA-4	R41A-2 IRC-8 EUR-5 IO-4 ICA-10
	6-4	CIA-12 USIA-10 Cairo-1

SUBJECT: Visit of David D. Newsom, Officer-in-Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs
To Yemen

The enclosed documents record the principal conversations conducted by David D. Newsom, Officer-in-Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs, with officials of the Yemen Government during a visit to Ta'iz May 11 - 16.

They include:

Memorandum of Conversation with Qadi Muhammad Al-Amri, May 12, 1958.
Memorandum of Conversation with Qadi Muhammad Al-Amri, May 12, 1958.
Memorandum of Conversation with Sheikh 'Ali al-Jabali, May 13, 1958.
Memorandum of Conversation with Qadi Muhammad Al-Amri, May 15, 1958.

Upon his departure, in view of the fact that the suggestion had been made that he see the Imam and the Imam was unable to receive him, Mr. Newsom addressed the letter to the Imam attached as Enclosure No. 5.

William R. Crawford, Jr.
American Consul

Copies sent to: London, Jidda

Dept please pouch copy to: Cairo

DDNewsom:nm

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REPORTER

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MESSAGE
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Desp. No. 177
From AmCon, Aden

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 12, 1958

Present:

Qadi Muhammad al-Amri, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen
'Ali Rajah, Foreign Office official
Mr. David Newsom, Officer-in-Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs,
Department of State.
Mr. Gordon Browne, Department of State
Mr. Michael Sterner, Vice Consul, Recorder
Ali Muhammad Ahmad, Consulate Aden Interpreter

Mr. Newsom and Mr. Browne were introduced to Qadi al-Amri and to Mr. Kenneth Oldfield, British Charge d'affaires in Ta'iz, the latter having just concluded a conversation with Qadi al-Amri. An exchange of amenities followed, during which Mr. Newsom gave Qadi al-Amri a personal letter from Mr. Hamdani of the Yemeni Legation in Washington.

Qadi al-Amri said that he wished to use, as a basis for his discussions with Mr. Newsom, the subjects which were covered in a recent meeting between the Imam, the Crown Prince, and himself. He said that he hoped that the Crown Prince would return to Ta'iz in time to enable Mr. Newsom to have a conversation with him. Also, said Qadi al-Amri, the Crown Prince would be happy to have a chance to visit the United States, not necessarily on a state visit, but as circumstances permitted--as for example, in case he should make a trip to the United Nations.

Qadi al-Amri said that, by way of introduction, he wished to point out that there was already a good foundation on which to build a close relationship between Yemen and the United States. Spiritually, the peoples of both nations believed in one God; in the realm of the material, Yemen was also demonstrably in need of the aid which the United States could provide. For a long time only one factor had existed to impede happy relations between Yemen and the United States, and that was the Palestine question. Later, however, the Richards Mission had forced Yemen to conclude that it was not highly esteemed by the United States. This, at any rate, was the Imam's point of view. Qadi al-Amri now hoped that it would be possible to have a frank exchange of views with Mr. Newsom, after which Qadi al-Amri would present a summary of these discussions to the Imam. In a final conversation with Mr. Newsom, Qadi al-Amri hoped to be able to convey the Government's answers to the various points raised.

Mr. Newsom said that Qadi al-Amri would appreciate that, on his part, he might not be in a position to give an answer to all of the questions which might be raised. The purpose of his trip to Yemen was solely to give himself a first-hand acquaintance with the officials and the situations in the countries

Reporting Officer: MSterner

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for which he had responsibility in the Department of State. He hoped that in these discussions it would be possible to look to the future, so that he could carry back with him any ideas which might contribute to better relations between the United States and Yemen.

Using Qadi al-Amri's introduction as a starting point, Mr. Newsom wished to make several comments. First, he wanted to emphasize the importance which the United States had always attached to relations with the Arab world. There were many situations in which the United States found itself in the uncomfortable position of being in the middle of disputes, but its fundamental hope was that all nations be members of the international community with full sovereignty and full dignity.

The United States also appreciated the Arab nations' desire to establish closer relations among themselves, and to encourage this trend, the United States had recognized and extended good wishes to both the U.A.R. and the A.F. Because of the recent settlement between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company, it had been possible to correct certain difficulties that had existed between Egypt and the United States. The United States was still not in perfect accord with the U.A.R., but it sincerely wished for a further improvement in relations if there were signs that the U.A.R. wanted the same.

This, briefly, was what the United States hoped for in the Arab world. Within that context, the United States had expressed its wish for better relations with Yemen. The Richards Mission was now history. Whereas there had been some difficulties connected with its experience in Yemen, the Richards Mission was a symbol of the interest of the United States in the nations of the Arab world. The Richards Mission had in turn been followed by the Wiens Mission.

Mr. Newsom said that every government's approach to various problems was different. He knew that comparisons had been made between what the United States was offering Yemen and what other nations were offering. Yemen's relations with other countries were its own business. The United States did not wish to compete with what other nations had done, or promised to do, in Yemen. The United States believed that small and careful beginnings were best in establishing a beneficial relationship between nations. Furthermore, because of its internal administrative procedures, the United States could not set aside for a program sums of money beyond the amount which it could reasonably expect to spend in a given year. This did not mean that the United States thought of the small beginning as an end, rather that it would lead to a continuing relationship. Mr. Newsom was ready to discuss what the United States had already suggested in the way of economic aid, or to discuss a new departure. There were no conditions attached to the United States proposal for grant assistance beyond those required to insure that the United States would be allowed to carry out its projects in such a way as to provide the best results for Yemen. There were, however, also possibilities for loans in case this proved to be of greater interest to the Yemeni Government.

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As part of the effort to improve relations, said Mr. Newsom, the United States hoped to be able to set up a modest legation in Yemen along the lines of the Yemeni Legation in Washington. He would not be honest if he did not say that there had been some disappointment in Washington regarding the lack of response to the United States request to open a legation, not to mention the continuing lack of housing for the two officers who now spent a lot of time in Yemen. Mr. Newsom appreciated that the Yemeni Government had these matters in mind. He was in Yemen not to insist or to urge, but to explain.

Qadi al-Amri thanked Mr. Newsom for his presentation of these subjects, and promised to give them his careful consideration. An appointment was made for a further conversation later in the same day.

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From AmCon, Aden

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 12, 1958

Participants:

Qadi Muhammad al-Amri, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen
Sayyid Muhammad al-Shami, Director General of the Yemeni Foreign Office
Mr. David Newsom, Officer-in-Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs,
Department of State.
Mr. Gordon Browne, Department of State
Mr. Michael Sterner, Vice Consul, Recorder
'Ali Muhammad Ahmad, Consulate Aden Interpreter

Subjects: 1. U.S. Economic Aid
2. U.S. Legation
3. Border Situation

Qadi al-Amri said that he had given careful consideration to the remarks made by Mr. Newsom that morning, and that he had some comments to make. Yemen regretted the deterioration of US relations with Arab countries, but had been happy, at least, to learn of the release of U.S.-held Egyptian assets. Mr. Newsom had mentioned that Yemen was making a comparison between the U.S. offer of aid to Yemen and aid extended by other countries. At the time of the Richards Mission Yemen had had no intention of asking for aid from the Soviet Bloc; therefore there had been no reason to make a comparison.

Mr. Newsom interjected that when he mentioned this subject he had been speaking generally, not just about the Richards Mission. Qadi al-Amri said that had any nation offered unconditional aid to Yemen at that time, it would have been accepted. Mr. Newsom said he wished to explain that the Richards Mission had arisen out of a special resolution of Congress which did not apply to other aid programs.

Qadi al-Amri turned to Mr. Newsom's comment about the slow progress attending U.S. efforts to set up a legation in Ta'iz. First of all, was it the intention of the U.S. to have only a charge d'affaires in Yemen? Mr. Newsom replied affirmatively, adding that it would be an independent legation reporting directly to Washington. Qadi al-Amri said that the Imam, ten years ago, had agreed that the U.S. would be the first to have a legation in Yemen. At that time the U.S. showed no interest in the matter. Then recently, the U.S. had shown a sudden interest in having its legation. Unfortunately, circumstances had been the cause of the delay since then. First, Yemen had been faced with the prospect of joining the U.A.R., and since part of the unification scheme called for an amalgamation of the foreign services of Yemen and the U.A.R., any consideration of a U.S. legation had to wait until the exact form of this amalgamation had been decided upon. Parenthetically, Qadi al-Amri said that he thought the final arrangement would be one whereby Yemen retained independent diplomatic relations with the major countries, such as the U.S., the U.K., and Saudi Arabia, while having in common with the U.A.R. representation to countries in which Yemen's interests were not so important. Continuing, al-Amri said that the month of

ME Sterner, Reporting Officer

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Ramadhan, during which Yemenis did practically no work, had also contributed to the delay. A decision concerning the house which Mr. Crawford intended to rent had been delayed because it had been expected that the question of the legation would be settled fairly soon.

Qadi al-Amri added that he had not been certain whether Mr. Crawford sought to rent the house as a private person or whether it would be rented by the Government. If Mr. Crawford, a diplomatic officer, rented the house as a private person, he said, it might cause some difficulties over the immunity of the property.

Mr. Newsom said that whereas the people in Washington might understand the circumstances which Qadi al-Amri had explained, they might still be puzzled by the fact that other nations had established diplomatic relations with Yemen during this period. Qadi al-Amri explained that the Saudi legation had been established in September 1957, before the creation of the U.A.R. In the case of the Russians, the arrival of their Ambassador in February was merely the implementation of arrangements which had been concluded between the two governments many months before.

Sayyid al-Shami added that unfortunately a decision on this matter had also been made more complicated for the Imam because of the rather grandiose scheme for a legation which the late Ambassador Wadsworth had presented. Mr. Newsom replied that Ambassador Wadsworth, who hoped for great things in Yemen, had probably been speaking in visionary terms. Mr. Newsom hoped that the Ambassador's informal remarks on the subject would not now prejudice the Yemen Government's consideration of the establishment of the modest post which was actually intended. Mr. Newsom said that whatever the outcome of the coming talks in Cairo on the nature of Yemen's representation abroad, he felt that it would be to the mutual advantage of both Yemen and the U.S. for the latter to have representation in Yemen, whether it be in the form of a legation or a consulate.

Referring to the house, which Mr. Crawford sought to rent, Mr. Newsom said that, while Mr. Crawford and Mr. Sterner appreciated the special arrangement made for them in the guest house, there were advantages to having their own house. He hoped that, if the Yemen Government could not agree to rent the house to them at this time, they would at least hold it for them until the decision on the legation had been reached. Qadi al-Amri agreed.

Crown Prince Visit to U.S.

Mr. Newsom, referring to Qadi al-Amri's passing remark during the conversation that morning about the Crown Prince's wish to visit the U.S., said that if the Crown Prince were in the U.S., he would be welcome in Washington at any time. Mr. Newsom would inform the Department of State of the Crown Prince's desire to visit the U.S., and it was possible that Mr. Crawford would be instructed to pursue this matter further. Qadi al-Amri thanked Mr. Newsom and confidentially informed him that the Crown Prince was thinking of representing Yemen at the next meeting of the General Assembly.

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Border Situation

Mr. Newsom said that during his short stay in Aden, some of the officials whom he had met had expressed regret over the confusion on their side about Yemen's recent attempt to have direct talks with the British on the border situation. They had expressed a renewed willingness to have direct talks toward achieving pacification of the border. *

Qadi al-Amri embarked on a detailed review of the history of the border dispute between Britain and Yemen. The duration of the 1934 agreement, he said, had been 40 years. The third clause in the agreement had stipulated that both parties should maintain the status quo during this period. Imam Yahya did not recognize the Turkish demarcation between Yemen and the Protectorate; consequently Yemen had always continued to seek a solution for the whole problem. If Imam Yahya had asked the British, in 1934, to give up part of the Protectorate as a partial solution to the problem, the British would have done so. Yemen did not wish to accuse the British of forgetting, but they did tend to forget if they had reasons for doing so. Yemen had documents that proved that the British offered to give up part of the Protectorate to reach a solution. G.O.Y. would present these documents to the U.N.

Qadi al-Amri said that it was the general opinion in the Protectorate that other Arab States had succeeded in liberating themselves while the Protectorate still suffered under foreign rule. Yemen knew that some of the Protectorate States did not wish to join the Yemen but wished only to free themselves from the British. When these states revolted the British retaliated brutally.

The Government of Yemen considered the Protectorate an integral part of Yemen.

Mr. Newsom asked whether the Government of Yemen considered that it was still possible to stop the border incidents now, putting off for the time being the future status of the Protectorate.

Qadi al-Amri said this was a most complicated problem. The people of the Protectorate States were in a very critical position; where could they turn for help? They turned to Yemen, and since Yemen was their neighbor it had to help them. There were now some 10000 refugees in Yemen. Some of these were chiefs who were deposed. They had come to Yemen looking for advice and sympathy in the same way that Yemen now turned to the U.S. for advice and sympathy.

The dispute had become worse since 1949. In the past, when there were misunderstandings, the British approached Yemen seeking a peaceful solution. Now they were using rifles and aircraft, bombing Yemen territory.

Yemen did not differ greatly with the British as to where the border line lay. The one exception was a town called Shabua, which Yemen claimed to be in her territory, while the British said that it was in the Protectorate. There were some other minor exceptions--places that in 1934 were not occupied by the British and therefore under the terms of the agreement had to be considered part of Yemen.

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Yemen had not tried to avoid an understanding; on the contrary it had done its best to reach one. Yemen went to London in August 1950, finished the discussions there in 1951, and concluded an agreement. Yemen had considered the agreement against its own interests, but had agreed for the sake of a solution. Yemen had also agreed with the British to stop propaganda against one another. Yemen had considered this agreement important, but the British had not. The demarcation of the frontier had not been important to the British, who had only wished to define the disputed areas. Nor had the British stopped their propaganda.

In 1948, Qadi al-Amri said, a Yemeni in Great Britain had attacked the GOY through a newspaper which he owned. He then went to Aden, and was given special privileges there, continuing to defame the Yemeni Government. He attacked the Government, the Waziri family, and the Free Yemenis. Some Yemen newspapers had continued to attack Imam Ahmad through 1953. The 1951 agreement contained a clause calling for later consideration of the extradition of criminals. Although there were more than forty ordinary criminals in Aden (not counting political criminals), Yemen had never been able to secure this consideration of extradition.

In spite of all this, Yemen had always expressed its good intentions to the Aden authorities. For example, when the Imam had heard that the Queen planned to visit Aden, he wished to send his son and the Chief of the Diwan (Royal Court) to participate in the ceremonies. The British refused this offer.

After the Queen's visit, relations deteriorated rapidly. The British then said that the U.K. wished to send a Minister to Ta'iz, but Yemen had replied that the time was unsuitable. The British propagandized against Yemen on this point.

Now the border troubles had become inextricably involved in the larger question of liberation in the Protectorate, and only naturally, Yemen's sympathies were with the Protectorate. To Tunis and Morocco and Algeria must now be added Southern Arabia. The desire for freedom of these areas falls under the Charter of the United Nations.

The British had accused Yemen of smuggling arms across the border. The facts were that three years and some months ago Yemen, to indicate its willingness to discuss the border problem, had invited Sir Tom Higgsbotham to Ta'iz. An agenda for discussion had been agreed upon. During these talks Prince Abdullah (Qadi al-Amri and Sayyid al-Shami having been present) completed agreement on all but one point; and it was on this point that the discussions foundered.

Qadi al-Amri said that the British accusation that Yemen was distributing arms could be considered partly true, but Yemen had embarked on this course only after it had discovered for a certainty that the British had distributed arms in the Jauf, near Kaulan, and in the eastern regions generally. Their purpose had been to incite revolution in Yemen.

There had been an attempted revolution in Sana'a a year ago. The rebels had been provided with arms by the British. Yemen had proof of the dates and other details of these British arms deliveries. Guns and money had been distributed

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through the Sharif of Bahran and the Audhali Sultan. For example, the Sharif had given, as a first installment only, 70,000 MT thalers and 500 rifles to tribes in Yemen. The British had also planned a coup d'etat against Imam Ahmad, but the Yemeni Government had been tipped off ten days before the coup was to start. This could only prove to Yemen that the British had evil intentions.

In spite of all this, the Imam sent Prince Badr to London with hopes of some sort of success. The first point on the agenda had been the question of the future of the Protectorate. Before departure, it had been agreed with Mr. Kemp that the Protectorate peoples would be represented at these discussions. When the Crown Prince had left for London, he was optimistic, but his hopes and expectations had been changed into disappointment. The British had thought that Yemen attached great importance to the Protectorate; and Yemen was certain the British only wished to demarcate the frontier.

Yemen had expected that the British would make certain proposals. The British did in fact make these proposals unofficially, but had refused to do so officially. Yemen had not asked that the Protectorate be turned over immediately, but had at least expected that this problem would be discussed.

Qadi al-Amri said that the next question was: How to ease the tension at present. If the British would not treat everything that their own puppet princes said as the word of God, and would carry on investigations of the situation on their own, the border problems would be solved. The puppet rulers always lied to the British in order to strengthen their own positions. If the British would control their own sultans, Yemen would then control its people. Both parties had to agree to retaliate, and both sides had to agree to investigate each incident objectively. Yemen had approached the U.N. for a fact-finding mission to determine the real aggressors.

The British would have to learn from the experience of France in Algeria and Tunisia, said Qadi al-Amri. The British would like to have a Sakiet in Yemen.

Qadi al-Amri said that he hoped this long review would be useful in understanding the situation. Yemen had faith in the American People, in their understanding and support.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 13, 1958

Present:

Sheikh 'Ali al-Jabali, Yemeni Commercial Agent for the Red Sea
Mr. David Newsom, Officer-in-Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs,
Department of State.

Mr. Gordon Browne, Department of State
Mr. Michael Sterner, Vice Consul, Recorder
Ali Muhammad Ahmad, Consulate Aden Interpreter

During the first part of the conversation, Sheikh 'Ali provided some very useful basic information about Yemen's coffee and cotton crops. Sheikh 'Ali believed that the most debilitating factor preventing an increase in production of these cash crops was not so much poor agricultural practices as an acute shortage in Yemen of banking facilities and development capital. The farmer lived from hand to mouth and never had enough capital to plant new land, improve his selection of trees or seeds, or repair the damages to his fields caused by floods.

Turning to more general matters, Mr. Newsom asked Sheikh 'Ali for his personal thoughts on the subject of U. S. economic aid to Yemen. Did he feel that the type of program which the U.S. had suggested was appropriate to Yemen's needs? Sheikh 'Ali replied that although the U.S. offer was three years late in coming, he believed that the Imam was now convinced of the desirability of economic aid from the U.S. The only problem was Crown Prince al-Badr, who felt that he had certain obligations to the Egyptians and to the Russians. The Crown Prince was planning to go to Cairo within the next few days, and it was possible (this information, said Sheikh 'Ali, was given in strictest confidence) that both Sheikh 'Ali and Qadi al-Amri would accompany the Crown Prince on his trip. With Yemen now linked to the U.A.R., all major problems, such as an aid program, would have to be taken up with Egypt before the Imam could make a decision. For this reason, Sheikh 'Ali, who had always favored U.S. economic aid in Yemen, was heartened by the news of the recent improvement of relations between the U.S. and the U.A.R.

Sheikh 'Ali said that as far as the type of program was concerned, the important thing was to choose projects which could be done rapidly and completely. He hoped that the U.S. would be able to avoid the predicament which had befallen two predecessors in Yemen, the Deilmann Corporation and the Russians. Both had come to odds with the Yemeni Government on the subject of wages to local employees. On the Hudaida port project, for example, the Russians had the arrangement with the Yemeni Government that the former should pay for the materials and engineering of the project, while the latter should pay for local labor. The project was originally conceived to employ 1500 local laborers. At the present moment this force had dwindled to 90, not because the Yemeni

Recording Officer:MSterner

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Government did not wish to pay, but simply because it had no money to do so. As far as Sheikh 'Ali could see (he had visited Hudaida two weeks previously) the project had come to a standstill. He mentioned this example because he hoped the U.S. would not make the same error. Unless one intended to complete the job from beginning to end, it would be better not to start at all, rather than risk getting bogged down as the Russians had. In reply to Mr. Newsom's question, Sheikh 'Ali said the Chinese, also, were counting on the Yemenis' paying for local labor.

Al-Jabali said that the main reason why the Imam had joined the U.A.R. was because King Saud had refused to give him the final installment of the 10 million dollar loan which had been negotiated in 1955. In contrast, Nasser had promised to give Yemen four million pounds a year for the next five years in order to carry out a currency reform and various other projects. Mr. Newsom asked whether the Imam had requested this aid, or whether it had been offered on Nasser's own initiative. Sheikh 'Ali replied that when Yemen discussed joining the U.A.R. with Nasser, it had set before him Yemen's dire economic needs, and Nasser had responded in this fashion.

Mr. Newsom said that he had heard that the Imam might prefer that U.S. economic aid be in the form of a loan rather than a grant. Sheikh 'Ali replied that he believed that the Imam had been 100 per cent persuaded to the idea of a grant.

Mr. Newsom said he had one final question. As Sheikh 'Ali knew, our relations with Egypt had been stormy recently. Throughout this period, however, Ambassador Hare had had cordial relations with President Nasser. He had never discussed with President Nasser the subject of Yemeni-U.A.R. relations; did Sheikh 'Ali feel that this might be helpful?

Sheikh 'Ali replied that he believed it would be. The right moment should be chosen, and this, in Sheikh 'Ali's opinion, was during the Crown Prince's imminent visit to Cairo.

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From AmCon, Aden

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 15, 1958

Participants:

Qadi Muhammad al-Amri, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen
Mr. David D. Newsom, Officer-in-Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs,
Department of State.
Mr. Michael Sterner, Vice Consul, Recorder
'Ali Muhammad, Consulate Aden Interpreter

After Qadi al-Amri had conveyed the Imam's apologies for having been unable to see Mr. Newsom because of a severe attack of rheumatism and intestinal disorders, Mr. Newsom gave to Qadi al-Amri a letter for the Imam, expressing regret that he had been unable to delay his departure further.

Mr. Newsom said that he hoped to take back to the Department some idea of the current feeling of the Yemeni Government about the several matters which affected U.S. - Yemeni relations. The first subject was economic aid. Mr. Newsom reviewed the several projects that had been suggested under the U.S. program. If it were true, as Mr. Newsom had heard, that the Hudaida-Sana'a road project had been given to the Chinese, he assumed that the Yemeni Government was no longer interested in our offer to build the Hudaida-Bajil road.

Qadi al-Amri said that unfortunately he had been out of the country when the U.S. aide-memoire had been presented by Ambassador Wadsworth. Upon returning, Qadi al-Amri had tried to persuade the Imam to allow the U.S. to build the Hudaida-Bajil stretch, and let the Chinese build the rest of the road from Bajil to Sana'a, but the Imam now felt that it would be better if the Chinese were responsible for one whole road. In the light of this, Qadi-al-Amri did not wish to press his point of view. What, he asked, was Mr. Newsom's feelings on the subject?

Mr. Newsom said that as Qadi al-Amri knew there had been some discussion during the Richards Mission suggesting that the whole road from Hudaida to Sana'a might be a U.S. responsibility. The Wiens Mission which followed concluded that so little would be known about the magnitude of the whole project until an aerial survey had been made that the U.S. would propose to build first only the Hudaida-Bajil part of the road. This did not mean, however, that the U.S. would have been unwilling to discuss ways in which it might be of assistance, through technical advice or a possible loan, in the construction of the remaining portion to Sana'a. It was only fair to say that it would be a disappointment to many in Washington to see this project given to someone else.

Qadi al-Amri asked Mr. Newsom's advice as to what the Yemeni Government's should do in this situation. Mr. Newsom replied that as an American he could say only one thing: allow the U.S. to build the Hudaida-Bajil road and to look ahead to consideration of the rest of the road. He of course was not in a position to

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Encl. No. 4
Desp. No. 177
From AmCon, Aden

commit the U. S. to build any part of the rest of the road, but it could be a matter for later discussion. Much would depend on how Yemen and the U.S. got along together on the Hudaida-Bajil project. His only advice was to give the U.S. a chance.

Qadi al-Amri asked what U.S. reaction would be if Yemen gave the Chinese the go-ahead on the Hudaida-Sana'a road and asked the U.S. to do another job. Mr. Newsom said that he was afraid that this would create considerable disappointment in Washington. As Qadi al-Amri knew, there had been a good deal of tension between the U.S. and Communist China. Not long ago our soldiers were fighting Chinese "volunteers" in Korea. The Chinese had imprisoned several Americans citizens. If he returned to Washington with the information that the largest project in our proposal had been turned over to the Chinese, some would say, "Why should we study another project when we have no assurance that it too will not be given to the Chinese or to someone else." Mr. Newsom would be happy to take back any suggestions for alternative projects, but he wished Qadi al-Amri to understand the attitude which might be encountered.

Qadi al-Amri thanked Mr. Newsom for his explanation. Yemen had long considered the building of a railroad from Hudaida to Sana'a, but after repeated surveys by a number of foreign firms and governments, the Yemeni Government realized that such a project would cost too much. So the Government had thought in terms of a motor road. Yemen had hoped that the U. S. would build the whole road, and the aide-memoire had come as a disappointment. This road was, of all the possible projects in Yemen, the one that the Government had felt had the highest priority. When they received the Chinese loan, the Yemeni Government had decided that they should go ahead with the Hudaida-Sana'a road. However, there were other important projects: water control and storage in Wadi Zabid and Wadi Mur (these two wadis now irrigated 30 - 40,000 acres but could be made to irrigate 100,000 acres with proper water storage); a dam at Wadi Sirdud to provide irrigation and hydro-electric power; a water reservoir in the Sana'a region.

Mr. Newsom said that he felt that in this whole question of U.S. economic aid, it was necessary for both parties to start up the mountain before they could talk about the other side. Our proposals represented those parts of Wiens Mission recommendations which could begin right away. Funds had been allocated on the basis of the projects set forth in the aide-memoire. It would be extremely difficult this late in the fiscal year to consider new projects. Mr. Newsom said he urged Yemen to start immediately on one or more of the projects proposed, and then other projects could be discussed.

Qadi al-Amri said that his Government had no intention of asking for these larger projects before the end of the fiscal year. He said that he had given careful thought to the Chinese offer. It had been accepted much as a result of his own recommendation in favor of doing so. And this advice had been given because Qadi al-Amri believed that by allowing the Chinese to come into Yemen, they were lessening their dependence on the Russians. Yemen had had a hard time resisting the very generous offers of the Russians. The Yemeni Government had

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Encl. No. 4

Desp. No. 177

From AmCon, Aden

decided, nevertheless, to limit Russian activity in Yemen to the Hudaida port project. They had turned to the Chinese for their other projects because they believed the Chinese to be, from Yemen's point of view, less dangerous than the Russians. Qadi al-Amri said he had convinced the Crown Prince to this point of view.

Mr. Newsom said he hoped Qadi al-Amri realized that, in following a policy of balancing aid from these three sources, the United States might be the most difficult to deal with. Russia and China would undoubtedly be continually pressing Yemen to accept more, whereas requests for assistance would be given studied consideration by the United States, with requirements for surveys and other preliminary steps required to insure a good job. It would require persistence to hold to a policy of a complete balance. Mr. Newsom commented that the girl who was easiest to catch did not always make the best wife.

Qadi al-Amri said that he knew the Russians very well. In balancing one foreign interest against another, Yemen was not trying to play one side off against the other but rather was following a traditional policy which he personally believed to be in his country's best interest. Mr. Newsom said that the U. S. was not averse to working in the same country with the Russians. All the U. S. asked for was a genuine neutrality.

Qadi al-Amri ended the conversation by saying that to achieve such a neutrality he believed that U.S. support was indispensable.

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Desp. No. 177
From AmCon, Aden

Taiz
May 15, 1958

Your Majesty:

I regret that my schedule of visits to our diplomatic and consular posts in the Arabian Peninsula does not permit me to make a longer visit to Yemen. I leave your Majesty's beautiful and historic land with a most favorable impression of the hospitality and friendliness of your people and of the courtesy and understanding of your officials. I hope the discussions which I have had with these officials will contribute in some measure to the furtherance of close and friendly relations between the Mutawakilite Kingdom of Yemen and the United States of America.

I leave with the hope that it may some day again be my privilege to visit Yemen.

Respectfully yours,

David D. Newsom
Officer-in-Charge, Arabian
Peninsula Affairs, Department
of State

His Majesty the Imam Ahmad
al-Nasr lil Din
King of Yemen

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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May 17, 1958

2:14 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Aden

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 183, May 17, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 183, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 90,
JIDDA 114, CAIRO UNNUMBERED.

FROM NEWSOM

DEPTEL 181 arrived after my departure Taiz. During conversations
Al-Amri I stressed importance positive action re Legation as
cornerstone any US-Yemeni cooperation. Al-Amri sympathetic
but decision depends on situation described preceeding telegram
re economic aid.

Having heard GOY might refuse landlord permission rent house
to Crawford and Sterner in Taiz, I extracted promise from
Al-Amri that he would not permit house be rented anyone else
until decision made re Legation. Presumably if decision
forthcoming soon and favorable, house currently under
construction will be available.

If Department desires use 1958 funds for Taiz, is it possible
purchase vehicle and give Aden funds for two additional local
employees for Taiz? At present trips by Crawford and Sterner
take two of three Consulate vehicles, only driver, and one
interpreter away from Aden for three weeks out of four.

EAL: UMT/1

CRAWFORD

JUN 24 1958

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611.866/5-1858
XN 641.866.2

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Consulate, Aden

180

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

May 18, 1958
DATE

REF :

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	NEA 4	RMIR-2 IRC-8 EUR-5 L-2 IO-4 FE-4		
	6-4	CIA-12 DSIA-10 OSD-4 ARMY 4		Cairo-1

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations Between Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen and Vice Consul Sterner, May 3 - 4, 1958. NAVY-3 AIR-1

There are transmitted as enclosures to this despatch memoranda of conversations held on May 3 - 4, between Qadi Muhammad Al-Amri, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen, and Mr. Michael Sterner, American Vice Consul in Aden.

William R. Crawford, Jr.
American Consul

Copies to: London, Jidda

Dept pouch to: Cairo

MESterner:nm

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Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 180
From AmCon, Aden

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 3, 1958

Participants:

Qadi Muhammad Al-Amri, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen.
Mr. Michael Sterner, American Vice Consul in Aden.
'Ali Muhammad Ahmad, Consulate Aden Interpreter

After an exchange of greetings, Qadi Al-Amri said that he wished Mr. Sterner to convey to his Government a formal message which concerned the increasingly serious situation on the Yemeni-Protectorate border. The Yemeni Government had received information that troops were being brought up to the border by the British, particularly in the areas around Suqa'ir (near Bab al-Mandab), Taur al-Baba (in the Lahej sector of the border), and al-Dukaim (east of Rahida on the Aden-Ta'iz road) -- these in addition to the forces which have regularly been stationed at Qataba, Baiqa, Beihan, and elsewhere on the border. Qadi Al-Amri believed that the Lahej incident had served as an excuse to bring up these reinforcements to the border. In addition, said Al-Amri, the British were propagating totally unfounded reports that the Yemenis were fortifying the Bab al-Mandab area. There were, in fact, no troops, no fortifications in Bab al-Mandab area at present (however, said Qadi Al-Amri, "we may put some there later if we feel like it.")

As it had already publicly announced, the Yemeni Government now proposed that a "neutral fact-finding commission" be set up to investigate the fighting on the border. Yemen was prepared to forget, for the time being, its claim to the Protectorate in order to concentrate on pacifying the border. Qadi Al-Amri believed that such a commission would discover that the "vast preponderance of aggressive actions" on the border must be laid on the British doorstep. He asked Mr. Sterner what he thought of the idea of a fact-finding commission.

Mr. Sterner replied that much would depend on the composition of the commission, and on other circumstances, such as the degree of cooperation it received from both sides. In general, he felt that while a fact-finding commission might be a good start, it would have to lead to something further in order to bring peace to the border. Laying the blame for these incidents on one side or the other would not, in itself, keep the tribesmen of both sides from shooting at each other, and this appeared to be the cause of most of the incidents. Furthermore we could see that fact-finding on the Israel-Jordan border, even with the weight of repeated censures from the United Nations, had not brought a stop to armed incidents on that border. Mr. Sterner personally felt, and he believed that this was still the view of his Government, that direct negotiations between Yemen and the U.K., leading to the creation of a joint supervisory commission on the border, offered the best prospect for a durable cessation of hostilities.

Reporting Officer:
MES¹erner:nm

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From Amcon, Aden

At this point the conversation was interrupted by the entrance of the Communist China Ambassador, who was accompanied by two of his party. Handshakes and introductions were exchanged, and an appointment was made by Mr. Sterner to see Qadi Al-Amri the next day.

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Encl. No. 2
Desp. No. 180
From AmCon, Aden

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

May 4, 1958

Participants:

Qadi Al-Amri, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen
Mr. Michael Sterner, Vice Consul, Aden
'Ali Muhammad Ahmad, Consulate Aden Interpreter

Subjects: 1. Chinese Economic Aid Program
2. U. S. Economic Aid
3. Russian Port Project
4. Border Situation

Qadi Al-Amri said that the Crown Prince had just arrived from Sana'a in order to pay 'Id greetings to his father and to consult with him on several matters. It was not known how long the Crown Prince would stay in Ta'iz.

Chinese Economic Mission

In answer to a question, Qadi Al-Amri said that the Chinese survey mission to Hudaida and Sana'a had been very successful. The details and timetable of their program had been worked out, with only the formal signatures of the Imam lacking to conclude the agreement. The Chinese would start on a road between Hudaida and Sana'a, probably over a new route via 'Ubal and Manaha (the same route which had been suggested to the American survey mission as a possible alternative to the existing one). At the same time work would begin on three factories: a small textile mill at Sana'a, a fish cannery at Hudaida, and a glass factory, probably to be located at Hajda, about 30 miles from Ta'iz on the Ta'iz-Hudaida road.

U.S. Economic Aid Program

Qadi Al-Amri then brought up the subject of U.S. economic aid. He reviewed in detail his last conversation with the Imam on the subject, the gist of which he had already mentioned to Mr. Crawford. Early in Ramadhan, the Crown Prince, with Al-Amri in attendance, was explaining to his father some points about the proposed Chinese road project. The Imam asked: "What about the American roads proposals?" After (according to Al-Amri) a long silence on the part of the Crown Prince, Qadi Al-Amri interjected the suggestion that since Yemen was building the Hudaida-Sana'a road with its own money* (loaned by China), why not accept the U.S. offer to improve the Ta'iz - Sana'a road, and also to build the Hudaida-Bajil stretch of the Hudaida - Sana'a road? The Imam expressed himself favorably to the former project, but when Al-Amri asked him again about the Hudaida-Bajil

*At several points in the conversation Al-Amri took pains to refer to the Chinese loan as "our own money" and once said, "we are free to do with it as we like because we are going to pay it back."

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From Amcon, Aden

road, the Imam said nothing.

Mr. Sterner asked Qadi Al-Amri whether this favorable response to the Ta'iz - Sana'a improvement project meant a definite intention to accept this part of the U.S. aid offer. Qadi Al-Amri said "not yet", but that since he intended to take this subject up at his next meeting with the Imam, he felt it would be a good thing "to feel the pulse in Washington about this matter." Qadi Al-Amri added with a smile that he trusted the U.S. would be generous on this project and make a finished road, rather than merely improvements, for at least part of the way.

Mr. Sterner asked whether the Imam had recently expressed an interest in accepting the other parts of the U.S. proposal. Qadi Al-Amri replied that he had not. On one occasion recently, Qadi Al-Amri had mentioned the coffee expert to him, but the Imam made no definite reply one way or the other.

Russian Port Project

Qadi Al-Amri said that the construction of a port at Ras al-Kathib had come to a stop because the Russians were no longer convinced that this site was a suitable one for a deep-water port. They had started work there with charts which had been made by an Egyptian port engineer several years ago, but found, soon after beginning, that shifting sands had so altered the underwater topography from that shown on the charts that a completely new survey would have to be made before work could proceed. When this was completed, a decision could be reached as to the feasibility of a project at Ras al-Kathib. In the meantime the Russians were constructing a small pier at Hudaida (Minat al-Hamdani) which could be turned into a deep-water port in case the project at Ras al-Kathib did not seem to be worthwhile.

Border Situation

Qadi Al-Amri said that he was sorry that the conversation on the previous day, concerning the border situation, had been interrupted. He wished to add a few more points on this subject. He had suggested an international fact-finding commission because the Yemeni Government had by this time despaired of achieving pacification of the border by means of bilateral talks with the British. Ways and means of stopping the fighting had been the second subject on the agenda of the London talks last November, but the British had proved to be so uncompromising on the first subject (the future of the Protectorate) that the problem of pacification was never discussed. Qadi Al-Amri had been ready to make several proposals toward a solution of this problem: the creation of a joint Anglo-Yemeni commission to enforce a cease-fire, the establishment of a no-man's strip at those points along the present de-facto boundary which were the worst trouble spots, and the immediate cessation of both British and Yemeni propaganda against the other side.

Mr. Sterner said that he thought one reason why the London talks had failed was that the personalities involved were at too high a level to accept a solution

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on minor matters only. Had the talks taken place on a working level, it might have been possible to limit them to a discussion of a temporary solution of the border trouble and avoid the larger problems, as for example, the future of the Protectorate, which were far more likely to lead to an impasse.

Qadi Al-Amri said that he agreed with this, but that unfortunately he saw no hope at the present time for working level discussions with the British, especially if they were to be with the Aden Government. In his opinion the British Foreign Office was inflexible, but nothing to compare with the officials in Aden. In addition, he felt that the British had made a definite shift toward a more militaristic policy recently, and that both London and Aden were now determined not to negotiate, no matter how conciliatory the Yemeni Government became. In this situation, what else could Yemen do except ask that the whole affair be exposed to world view?

As the hour was getting late, Mr. Sterner closed the conversation by conveying the Department's reply to Qadi Al-Amri's request that U.S.G. sound out S.A.G. on the subject of an improvement in Egyptian - Saudi relations. Qadi Al-Amri expressed appreciation for the Department's reply and added that the Yemeni Government was also approaching S.A.G. on the same subject through its own contacts.

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US policy towards Yemen

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Date 21 May 1958
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Date 23 May 1958
From STATE
To LONDON

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FROM : American Consulate, ADEN
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF :

18
DESP. NO.

August 4, 1958
DATE

611.86h/8-458

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SUBJECT: CONVERSATIONS IN YEMEN: JULY 1958

Transmitted as enclosures are memoranda of conversations recently held
between the Consul and Yemeni officials in Ta'iz.

Michael Sterner
Michael Sterner
American Vice Consul

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of Conversation, July 19, 1958
2. Memorandum of Conversation, July 20, 1958
3. Memorandum of Conversation, July 23, 1958

Copies sent to: London, Jidda

Dept please pouch: Cairo

WRCrawford/nm
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Page 1 of
Encl. No. 1
Desp. No. 13
From AmconAden

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

July 19, 1958

Participants:

Qadi Muhammad al-'Amri, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
W. R. Crawford, American Consul, Aden
'Ali Muhammad 'Ahmad, Interpreter

Subjects:

Visit of Polish Ambassador
Audience with Crown Prince Badr
Rental of Consular Residence, Ta'iz
Dire Dawa Talks
Yemeni Airlines

Mr. Crawford thanked Qadi al-'Amri for the pleasant dinner given by the Government on July 15 on the eve of the Polish Ambassador's departure for Cairo. Qadi al-'Amri said he had felt obligated to do something for the Ambassador. The Crown Prince had been very well treated when he visited Poland the previous winter but the Ambassador had been rather upset by his reception in Yemen. He had, unfortunately, arrived late in June during the 'Id al-Adha when all Government activity was suspended for six days. After the 'Id the Imam had not been feeling well and had been unable to see the Ambassador and Qadi al-'Amri himself had been sick. After almost three weeks of seeing no one, he had been sent to Sana'a and Marib. On his return, finding that he still had no appointment scheduled with the Imam, he had come to Qadi al-'Amri in a very unhappy mood, complaining that if the Imam was sick at least the Crown Prince was not. Finally he had had a brief meeting with the latter and presented his credentials.

Mr. Crawford asked whether Poland contemplated any sort of technical aid to the Yemen. Qadi al-'Amri said that he thought the Poles were only interested in establishing some trade relations with his country. His impression had been that Poland was rather a poor country which was too concerned with its problems at home to give much thought to helping others. Mr. Crawford said he believed this to be so; in its recent efforts to gain some measure of independence from the Soviet Union, Poland had asked for and received some American aid. It would be rather a surprise to see Poland use this money for projects in the Yemen. Qadi al-'Amri said that he thought Poland was having some success in weaning itself away from the Soviet Union. Mr. Crawford said he hoped this would prove true.

Mr. Crawford said that he hoped the same evil genie which had been at work during the Polish Ambassador's visit would not seek to mar his own present stay in Yemen. He had sent a letter to the Crown Prince ten days ago asking to pay a courtesy call and so far had received no reply. In addition the Government had still failed to come to a decision on the question of his renting a residence

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Desp. No. 18
From AmCon, Aden

in Ta'iz. The landlord of the property he had in mind had informed him several times that he would have to rent the property to some one else, unless a lease could be signed promptly. Mr. Crawford said that he realized Qadi al-'Amri had done his best to be of help on this question, but he still did not think it would be easy to explain to his government the reasons for the Yemeni Government's procrastination on a matter so routine. He wondered if it might be helpful to ask the Department of State to intercede with the Yemeni Chargé d'affaires in Washington, in the hope that the latter would cable the Imam, it being fairly common knowledge that His Majesty usually paid special heed to telegrams coming from diplomatic missions abroad.

Qadi al-'Amri said that the Crown Prince had told him again two or three days ago that he wished to see the American Consul and would let him know when the audience would be convenient. Qadi al-'Amri said that during this same meeting with the Crown Prince he had reminded him that the Imam had given oral approval to Mr. Crawford's renting a house in Ta'iz and then left it up to the Crown Prince to confirm the approval in writing. The Crown Prince, unfortunately, had replied to Qadi al-'Amri that this was not the right time to reach a decision in this matter.

Qadi al-'Amri said that if the Crown Prince were not in Ta'iz he would take it upon himself to raise the matter again with the Imam. Since the Crown Prince was here, however, he did not very well feel he could by-pass him. He thought Mr. Crawford's suggestion of cabling to Washington a good one. He hoped that in talking to the Yemeni Chargé d'affaires the State Department would base its statement of concern not only on the ground of recognized diplomatic privileges but would also make some mention of the friendly treatment accorded all Yemenis, both official and private, visiting the United States. The Imam was susceptible to approaches of this emotional or moral sort.

Qadi al-'Amri said that if something should prevent Mr. Crawford's getting the house he wished, why did he not consider taking the large apartment in the guest house that had formerly been occupied by M. Raffaneau, the French engineer.

Mr. Crawford said that Qadi al-'Amri's suggestion was very kind. Should something happen to his arrangements about the other house he would gratefully accept the apartment in the Guest House. Frankly, however, he would prefer a private house and would be extremely disappointed if the Government should delay so long that the house he had in mind went to someone else.

Qadi al-'Amri said he hoped Mr. Crawford would be able to rent the house he wished but he could not pretend to be very optimistic. While the Crown Prince had not said so directly, Qadi al-'Amri felt that his reaction had been prompted by the American actions in Lebanon.

Mr. Crawford said that to turn from the administrative problems they had been discussing, he wished to inquire about the results of the meetings held with British representatives in Dire Dawa. Qadi al-'Amri replied that suggestions had been made by each side and noted by the other. That was about all. Mr. Crawford

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Desp. No. 18
From AmCon, Aden

said that he was hopeful that at least a relationship between the two sides had been established which might permit future disputes to be discussed in a friendly way before, as so often in the past, they degenerated into open warfare along the de facto frontier.

Qadi al-'Amri said that he was not very encouraged. To get anything done in Yemen, one had to depend on personal relationships of trust and confidence. There were times when he had the trust of His Majesty and could accomplish something, but the Imam was erratic and suspicious, particularly on matters pertaining to the border, and this relationship of trust could break easily. It had taken him 25 days to break down the Imam's suspicions about meeting the British. Even at the last minute the Imam had wanted to cancel the meetings when the British had said that Trevaskis could not come and that someone else would take his place, but he had persuaded him that he had promised and could not break his word at the last minute. Unfortunately, the British always seemed to do something aggressive on the border just when there was a chance of reaching agreement. First had come the British planes over Harib. Perhaps they had come on reconnaissance to see what troops or guns might have been moving into the area, but in any case they had flown directly over the city and been fired upon. Then they had come back in force and one had been shot down. In order to bring peace along the border the Yemenis had withdrawn last fall from the Jabal Shukair, which they regarded as their territory, but with an oral promise from the British Charge that the Jabal would not be occupied by British forces after the Yemeni withdrawal. Now Qadi al-'Amri had confirmed reports that gun emplacements and British troops had been put into position on the hill. The British had asked that the Dire Dawa meetings be kept secret, but in the middle of the meetings the BBC had announced what was going on. The Imam had called him and accused him of betraying Yemen because the meetings had been his idea, pointing out that the British announcements made it look as if Yemen were secretly suing for peace.

Mr. Crawford said that he realized how unfortunate the Yemenis might regard the publicity leak. He did not feel, however, that the blame should be attached entirely to the British. Before leaving Aden he had seen Mr. Phillips who had told him in confidence of the possibility of the meetings in Dire Dawa. Phillips had said to him that the meetings were to be held in secret but that this secrecy would be very difficult to maintain, since the Ethiopian Government, the Yemeni Government and the Aden authorities all knew what was going to happen. Phillips had said that he had received a visit that very morning from a cousin of one of the Protectorate rulers who had just returned from Ta'iz and had come into his office to ask the purpose of the Dire Dawa talks, indicating that the intention to hold such meetings was fairly common knowledge in Ta'iz.

Mr. Crawford said that in spite of the disappointments connected with the meetings, he hoped that both sides would try to build constructively on what positive results there had been.

Qadi al-'Amri agreed but said that it was very difficult to try to come to terms with the British. When the Yemeni Government had protested over the publicity given the Dire Dawa meetings, the British Charge in Ta'iz had replied

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From AmCon, Aden

that the BBC was an entirely independent news agency for which the British Government could not be responsible.

Mr. Crawford said that in pursuance of a conversation he had had a few months before with Qadi al-'Amri, he wished to inquire about the status of Yemeni Airlines. Qadi al-'Amri replied that the Crown Prince wanted to build three airports in Yemen capable of taking larger aircraft: at Hudaida, at Ta'iz (not at the site of the present airport but at Janad), and at Sana'a. Work on the latter had already begun. Mr. Crawford asked who was building the airport at Sana'a. Qadi al-'Amri said that so far only the ground was being cleared - for a runway three or four kilometers in length. The Crown Prince's plan was to train Yemeni pilots to run the Airline, by means of a flying school to be established in Yemen. In the meantime, he wanted to start scheduled services within the country and weekly services to Asmara and Cairo. For these he intended to use Egyptian pilots and crews until such time as Yemenis could be trained to take over.

Mr. Crawford asked whether further thought had been given to seeking assistance from nearby countries with well-established airlines, such as Ethiopia or Saudi Arabia. Qadi al-'Amri said that Ethiopian Airlines was now quite popular in Yemen. He wondered what sort of services it could provide to assist Yemeni Airlines. Mr. Crawford said that one good example had come up quite recently. A Yemeni Airlines Aero Commander had crash-landed on the Tihama and been fairly seriously damaged. After receiving a telegram from the manager of Yemeni Airlines, Ethiopian Airlines had agreed to repair the plane in Addis Ababa or to send mechanics to carry out the work in Ta'iz. In addition to repair services, Ethiopian Airlines might be in a position to lend pilots or planes on charter, or even to conclude a contract to manage and operate Yemeni Airlines so that it might be turned into a profit-making operation instead of a drain on the Government's finances.

Qadi al-'Amri said that it would be a good idea from Yemen's point of view to take assistance in such matters from countries nearby. He wondered, for instance, whether Ethiopian Airlines could undertake overhauls of aircraft belonging to Yemeni Airlines so that they could be sent to Addis Ababa rather than to Italy or some other European country. Mr. Crawford said that he believed Ethiopian Airlines was only equipped to carry out repairs, but promised that he would inquire and inform Qadi al-'Amri at a later date.

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Desp. No. 18

From AmCon, Aden

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

July 20, 1958

Participants:

Sayyid Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman Al-Shami, Director General Ministry of Foreign Affairs

W. R. Crawford, American Consul, Aden

'Ali Muhammad Ahmad, Interpreter

Subjects:

Anglo-Yemeni Talks Dire Dawa

Rental of Consular Residence

Mr. Crawford welcomed Sayyid Al-Shami on his return from the meetings held with British officials in Dire Dawa during the previous week and asked whether he would care to comment on how the meetings had gone.

Sayyid Al-Shami remarked that the meetings had started off well but finished badly. Both sides were now considering the proposals which had been made, primarily that for a cease-fire. In view of Britain's recent renewal of aggressive activity it was doubtful that much could be hoped for. The British had illegally occupied Jabal Shukair, had bombed Harib and more recently Baida, and sent British troops into the Yemeni village of Sugayyah near Bab Al-Mandab. This was the typical British reaction whenever there was a possibility of better relations.

There followed a lengthy discussion of Mr. Crawford's efforts to rent a private residence in Ta'iz, during the course of which Sayyid Al-Shami agreed that the Yemeni Government had perhaps acted at variance with international diplomatic practice in intervening in the question. He felt, however, that the Government would not now prevent Mr. Crawford from proceeding to negotiate a lease.

Mr. Crawford said that during Sayyid Al-Shami's absence he had written to the Crown Prince informing him of his wish to pay a courtesy call. If this audience was not too long delayed, he hoped to be able to visit Sana'a during his present stay.

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Encl. No. 3
Desp. No. 18
From AmCon, Aden

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

July 23, 1958

Participants:

Qadi Muhammad Al-'Amri, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
W. R. Crawford, American Consul, Aden
'Ali Muhammad Ahmad, Interpreter

Subject:

Rental of Consular Residence
Lebanon

Mr. Crawford reported his conversation of July 20 with Sayyid Al-Shami. He wondered whether Al-Shami was expressing an official or merely a private opinion in advising him to go ahead with the negotiation of a lease for housing in Ta'iz. In any case the question was now somewhat academic. He would have to proceed with negotiation of the lease or lose the house to the Ethiopian Consul, but he had not wanted to do so without informing Qadi Al-'Amri since it was he who had laid the ground for approval by the Imam and the Crown Prince.

Qadi Al-'Amri said that on July 20 Sayyid Al-Shami had been speaking privately. As a result of his conversation with Mr. Crawford, however, he had seen the Crown Prince on the following day and the Crown Prince, busy preparing his departure for Hudaïda, had said rather vaguely that it would be all right for the Americans to rent a house. His advice to Mr. Crawford would be to negotiate the lease and show it to Sayyid Al-Shami as a courtesy before signature. That way the latter would be reminded that permission had been given.

There followed a long discussion of events in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Qadi Al-'Amri acknowledged that the evidence pointed to simultaneous revolts having been planned for the three countries and that the United States had to show that it would stand by its friends or lose the Middle East entirely. No sensible Arab believed that the United States would seek to remain in military occupation of Lebanon but the common man was more stirred by propaganda than fact and feeling in the Middle East was undoubtedly running high against the United States. The latter, however, must have taken this, as well as the military capabilities of the Russians, into full account before deciding to send troops. The decision could not have been an easy one for President Eisenhower, although legally and morally justified. Qadi Al-'Amri wondered whether history might show that the decision had come too late to save the day.

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(With Unclassified Enclosures)
(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Consulate, Aden

68
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 4, 1958

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Copies of Official Notes and Letters Delivered in Ta'iz

There are enclosed for the Department's records copies of the official documents delivered to the Government of Yemen during the Consul's recent visit to Ta'iz. These documents were handed to Qadi Muhammad Al-'Amri, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen, during the Consul's last call on Al-'Amri on October 28, 1958, the last day of the recent Ta'iz visit. During this call, the Consul was accompanied by Mr. Wolle of the Consulate and by 'Ali Muhammad Ahmad, the Consulate's interpreter.

The documents are:

1. A note advising the Yemeni Government of the termination of the assignments of Vice Consul Sterner and Second Secretary Donohoe, and requesting provisional recognition for Consul William D. Wolle, and Commercial Attaché Gordon H. Browne.
2. A note concerning the loss of American citizenship by Mr. Bruce Conde.
3. A letter to the Imam.
4. A letter to the Crown Prince.

During the conversation with Al-'Amri, the Consul expressed his deep regret that the Crown Prince's "indisposition" had prevented his granting an audience during the course of this visit, since the matters for discussion were of importance to the relations of Yemen and the United States. He remained hopeful that the Crown Prince would be able to grant an audience to him or his representative at an early date, preferably on or about the fifteenth of November.

Al-'Amri stated that he hoped the United States would continue its practise of having its consular officers in Aden make periodic visits to Yemen. He went on to express the hope that, should the Crown Prince indicate his readiness to receive Mr. Crawford at some specific future date, the Consul would be prepared to come to Yemen from Aden on short notice. He said also

WilliamWolle/nm
REPORTER

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Desp. No. 68

From AmCon, Aden

that he believed it advisable for U.S. representatives to continue to use moderate and courteous language in official correspondence addressed to the Imam and Crown Prince, and to refrain from including the names of any Yemeni officials or other personalities whom the United States might believe to be willfully blocking its efforts to improve relations with the Yemen.

Al-'Amri was assured by Mr. Crawford that he and his deputy hoped to continue making periodic visits, and that the present schedule tentatively called for Mr. Wolle to commence a visit to the country about mid-November.

Near the conclusion of the conversation, attention was turned to the subject of the border disputes between Yemen and the Protectorates. This subject will be covered in the Consulate's current Political Fortnightly despatch, now being prepared.

William R. Crawford, Jr.
William R. Crawford, Jr.
American Consul

Enclosures: As stated.

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Desp. No. 68

From Aden, Arabia

Ta'iz, October 25, 1958

The Legation of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of the Yemen and has the honor to inform the Royal Ministry of the termination of the assignments of Second Secretary and Consul, Joseph Donohoe, and Third Secretary and Vice Consul, Michael E. Sterner. Pending receipt of their Commissions, provisional recognition of the status of the following two new officers assigned to the Legation is respectfully requested: William D. Wolle, as Second Secretary and Consul, and Gordon H. Browne, as Commercial Attache.

The Legation of the United States of America avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Royal Ministry the assurances of its highest consideration.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of

The Mutawakkilite Kingdom of the Yemen
Ta'iz.

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Desp. No. 68

From Aden, Arabia

Ta'iz, October 27, 1958

Your Excellency:

I refer to letter No. 6313/17/B addressed to me by His Excellency Sayyid Muhammad al-Shami on 25 Ramadhan, 77, corresponding to April 14, 1958 informing me that on February 20, 1958, Bruce Alphonso (Alfonso) de Bourbon-Conde, an American citizen, declared his allegiance to His Majesty the Imam Ahmad, King of the Yemen, and on the same date renounced his previous allegiance to the United States of America.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that as a consequence of the action taken by Mr. Conde, and following his own subsequent statement in writing to the Secretary of State of the United States of America that he wished to renounce his American citizenship, the Department of State approved, effective August 27, 1958, Mr. Conde's loss of the nationality of the United States. For this reason, Mr. Conde is henceforth deprived of any of the rights and privileges of American citizenship. His passport has been withdrawn and will not be returned to him. A copy of the Certificate of the Loss of the Nationality of the United States, approved by the Department of State, has been handed to Mr. Conde.

I should appreciate your transmitting a copy of this letter to His Excellency, Sayyid Muhammad al-Shami, upon his return to the Yemen.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

William R. Crawford, Jr.
Charge d'Affaires and Consul

His Excellency,
'Ali Raja,
Acting Director General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Ta'iz, Yemen.

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Encl. No. 3

Desp. No. 68

From Aden, Arabia

Ta'iz, October 27, 1958

Your Majesty:

It is with regret that I must trouble Your Majesty with a matter of personal concern.

I and the members of the Consulate staff have always been most grateful for the hospitality extended to us during our visits to Yemen by the Yemeni people and, more particularly, for the kindness shown by Your Majesty's Government in permitting us to occupy quarters in the Dar al-Diyaafa. For some time, however, it has been my wish to obtain a personal residence in Ta'iz, both to avoid being a burden on Your Majesty's Government and to provide a home where my wife and the wives of the other officers who visit Yemen might reside in a more fitting privacy than is possible in the Dar al-Diyaafa. Anxious to obtain the assistance of Your Majesty's Government in this matter, I informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of my wish several months ago. After some deliberation the Ministry indicated verbally its approval of the plan and I proceeded to negotiate a lease for a house in Ta'iz owned by Shaikh Gazem Muhammad 'Abdulla al-Hirwi. An interim lease was agreed upon and a copy of this was given to His Excellency Sayyid Muhammad al-Shami, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on August 9, 1958, corresponding to Muharram 24, 1378.

Recently, however, I was informed by the landlord, Shaikh Gazem Muhammad 'Abdulla al-Hirwi, that he feared to allow me to occupy the house without written authority from the Government. During my two most recent visits to Your Majesty's Kingdom I have sought an audience with His Royal Highness, Crown Prince Badr, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an effort to obtain His Highness's assurance in writing that Your Majesty's Government perceived no objection to my renting the house in question. During both visits, unfortunately, His Highness had been unable to receive me. Since this is a matter of concern to me, I should be most grateful for Your Majesty's personal intercession in order that Shaikh Gazem Muhammad 'Abdulla al-Hirwi may be assured in writing that his agreement with me has the Government's entire approval.

Please, accept, Your Majesty, the assurances of my greatest respect and esteem.

William R. Crawford, Jr.
American Consul

His Majesty Imam Ahmad bin Yahya Hamid al-Din
King of Yemen,
Ta'iz, Yemen.

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Desp. No. 68
From Aden, Arabia

Ta'iz, October 27, 1958

Your Royal Highness:

I regret that Your Royal Highness's recent indisposition has prevented your receiving me, in accordance with my telegraphic request of October 10, 1958, during my present visit to Yemen. My request for an audience with Your Highness was sent pursuant to instructions received from the Department of State to discuss with Your Highness several matters of urgent mutual concern. Pressing business now necessitates my return to Aden, but I trust that Your Highness will inform me by letter or cable of a date on or about November 15 on which it would be convenient for you to receive me or my representative.

One of the matters which I had hoped to take up with Your Highness concerns the rental of housing for representatives of the United States visiting Yemen.

The United States has for several years been pleased to grant hospitality to the Legation of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of the Yemen, Washington. In accordance with normal reciprocal courtesies, the United States proposed, in the fall of 1957, that a resident United States diplomatic mission be established in Ta'iz. To date, no reply to this proposal has been received from the Yemeni Government. Pending receipt of a reply, the United States has indicated its willingness to continue the accreditation of its representatives in Aden as its representatives also in Yemen. It seeks, however, and as a minimum privilege of international courtesy, to rent a residence in Ta'iz for the use of these representatives.

Anxious to obtain the assistance of His Majesty's Government, I discussed this matter with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs several months ago. After some deliberation the Ministry indicated that His Majesty had approved, verbally, the rental of a house. After being informed of His Majesty's approval, I proceeded to negotiate a lease for a house in Ta'iz owned by Shaikh Gazem Muhammad 'Abdulla al-Hirwi. A lease was agreed upon and a copy of this was given to His Excellency Sayyid Muhammad al-Shami, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on August 9, 1958, corresponding to Muharram 24, 1378.

His Royal Highness

Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

The Mutawakkilite Kingdom of the Yemen.

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From Aden, Arabia

Recently, however, I was informed by the landlord, Shaikh Gazem Muhammad 'Abdulla al-Hirwi, that he feared to allow me to occupy the house without written authority from the Government. I have so far been unable to obtain this authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since this is a matter of considerable concern to me both officially and personally, I should be most grateful for Your Highness's intercession in order that Shaikh Gazem Muhammad 'Abdulla al-Hirwi may be assured in writing that his agreement with me has the Government's entire approval. I should appreciate receiving from Your Highness an indication of the action taken in this regard.

Please accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my greatest respect and esteem.

William R. Crawford, Jr.
Charge d'Affaires and Consul
of the United States of America

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NO.

SENT TO: Amembassy, LONDON G-419

Rptd Info: Amembassy, CAIRO G-72
Amconsul, ADEN G-14
Amembassy, ADDIS ABABA G-35

Department on November 21 informed British Embassy of intention accredit Ambassador Hare to Yemen as Minister. Department explained move was result of US desire increase influence in Yemen and followed pattern set by other diplomatic missions. Department made it plain move not intended imply any support more effective UAR influence in Yemen. Timing of move would depend upon completion efforts obtain house in Yemen and choice of officer to serve as resident Charge.

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Drafted by: *W*
NEA:NE:DDNewsom:lc

Airgram transmission and
classification approved by:

NE - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

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Date Sent:
Rec'd:

Dec 16, 1958 4:30

FROM: Embassy LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: G- 593

RPT INFO: ADEN G-UNIT, ADDIS ABABA G-UNIT, CAIRO G-UNIT, JIDDA G-UNIT.

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PAGE 1 OF 1
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Department's G-419.

During December 11 conversation on Arabian Peninsula matters, Foreign Office (Riches) told Embassy he had heard from UK Embassy Washington that U. S. Government intended to accredit Ambassador in Cairo rather than Ambassador in Jidra as Minister to Yemen. Riches' manner casual and rather approving. Arrangement struck him as possessing many practical advantages because many important Yemenis visited Cairo and usually passed through there on their way to other areas. Riches said new arrangement would not perceptibly enhance prestige of U.S. In any case, he was sure Nasser's influence in Yemen had nothing to do with U.S., which was purely formal and ineffective institution. Riches expressed interest in implications which U. S. Government's decision held for our long-standing effort to establish post in Yemen. Embassy officer said U. S. Government continued desire permanent resident representative in Yemen.

Comment: Embassy considers that Department's explanation of background this change (ref airgram) was helpful in allaying any Foreign Office misgivings that U. S. embarking on program working on Yemeni matters through UAR.

WITNESS

POL/N: GVMcClanahan:ls
December 16, 1958

Clearance:

POL/N - Mr. Burdett

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

611.86H/12-1958

This Document must be Returned
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DATE: December 19, 1958

SUBJECT: US Relations with Yemen

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Ahmad Zabarah, Yemeni Charge d'Affaires
Mr. Armin H. Meyer, NE
Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

COPIES TO: NE (3cc) NEA (1) O (1) BNA (1) AFN (1) NEA/EX (1)
INR (1) IRC (8) Aden (1)

DEC 23 1958

Mr. Meyer welcomed Mr. Zabarah back from the United Nations General Assembly and thanked him for his help to the U.S. Delegation during the recent session.

He explained that there had been two developments in U.S. relations with Yemen which he wished to explain to Mr. Zabarah and told him of the request to the Yemen Government for an agreement for Ambassador Hare in Cairo and of the conclusion of leases on two houses in Taiz.

Mr. Zabarah promised to cable his government and urge an early and favorable reply on the agreement.

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FROM: Aden

TO: Secretary of State

NO: Unnumbered, March 5, 10 a.m.

Control:
Rec'd:

4717

March 7, 1959

3:59 p.m.

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FROM HARE IN TALZ

Arrived Talz March 4.

At non-specific introductory talk March 5, found Al-Amri friendly as always but more optimistic than he has seemed in past over opportunities furthering USG-GOY cooperation.

One opportunity Al-Amri may have had in mind indicated by very brief discussion held with Crawford while awaiting my arrival at airport. Al-Amri stated Imam wished proceed with allocation Yemen oil concession to foreign firm. While might seek offers from several sources, before doing so desired receive firm offer from Standard of New Jersey and asking USG encourage Standard submit offer soonest. Imam aware Deilmann concession remained to be disposed of before title clear, but prepared offer Standard concession including northern Tihama if that obstacle could be removed. Imam did not wish negotiators come to Yemen at present. Sought definite offer "as generous as possible with figures," i.e., about 52-48 division profits favor GOY. Crawford replied USG would probably be glad put Standard again into contact with GOY but, re "profits," pointed out Standard adhered strictly in all other countries to 50-50 formula.

Since evident we should not lose opportunity which Imam appears offering us bring reliable US oil firm into Yemen, I hope continue discussion of possible Standard concession at later meeting with Al-Amri. If at all possible before expected departure March 9, would appreciate receiving

indication company's

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-2- Unnumbered, March 2, 10 a.m., from Aden

indication company's present views and whether it would consider making firm summary offer: proposed on GOY's clearing up Deilmann concession and offering entire Tihama.

WOLLE

VH:HC/5

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RG: 59

Entry: ARAB PEN.

Box: 2557

(16)
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DESP 676
Date 12 MARCH 1959
From CAIRO
To STATE

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☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NNJ 897 428
Authority

5/8/90
Date J.V.G.

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Department of State

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SENT TO: Amlegation, TAIZ

Rptd Info: Amembassy, CATRO
~~AmConsul, ADEN~~

2724

546

Origin

Info

You may inform Al Amri Department has received with gratification reports

Ambassador Hare's visit. We appreciate cordial welcome extended by His Majesty

and other officials and are giving prompt attention various matters raised.

FOR AMBASSADOR AND STAFF:

While appreciating ^{many} ~~some~~ problems remain in connection our position Yemen
believe your visit has been most successful in beginning fresh page US-Yemeni
relations.

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(Offices
Only)

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ACTING

(SwR)

HERTER

611.86H/3-1759

RM/R
Anal <u>47</u>
Rev _____
Cat _____

Drafted by:

NEA: NE: DDNewsom:lc

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NE - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

S/S-CR

MAR 17 1959 P.M.

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611.86H/3-1759

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 14060
Rec'd: March 22, 1959
10:54 a.m.

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2728, March 21, 3:00 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2728, REPEATED INFORMATION BAGHDAD 328,
TAIZ 3.

I called on Crown Prince Badr yesterday at Tahira Palace. Hasan Bin Ibrahim, Imam's Deputy Cairo, was present and interpreted. As previously agreed in Taiz with Qadi Al-Amri, I gave Badr full account my recent visit Yemen and my conversations with Imam and Al-Amri, omitting only subject oil concession. Badr listened attentively to my explanation GOY request for additional famine aid in form wheat flour and suggestions for modification details outstanding US economic aid offer. He made no (repeat no) particular comment on agriculture and coffee experts or Taiz-Sanaa road improvement. Re proposed substitution airports for aerial survey and postponement latter until final settlement Yemen borders, Badr remarked this very important, since survey conducted within present frontiers might imply GOY acceptance existing borders. Private exchange between Badr and Hasan left me with impression Badr considered replacement Hodaïda-Bajel road with another of comparable length was rather small-scale project.

Badr expressed satisfaction with account my visit and hoped it would result in "turning over new leaf" in US-Yemen relations.

In reply question Badr stated he will remain Cairo "some days" before returning Yemen, adding there little to be done in Yemen during Ramadan.

Badr spoke ruefully of his three week tour of Syria with Nasser which evidently failed gratify his Sybaritic tastes.

He

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611.56H/5-2159

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-2- 2728, March 21, 3 p.m., from Cairo.

He mentioned large amount of walking involved and onerous auto trips over snow and ice-covered mountain roads. He had arrived with warm weather wardrobe, and as all shops closed promptly upon arrival Nasser's party in successive towns, he was unable purchase warm clothing; after few days in Latakia shops reopened and he stocked up on woolens, by which time weather had turned warm.

Badr broached subject Iraq by asking what information I had on situation there. I replied our information limited since activities our Embassy Baghdad circumscribed, but there no (repeat no) doubt large-scale Communist activity going on, and this had serious implications. We had little news about conditions in country generally, although recent reports indicated Baghdad itself had returned to relative calm, PRF engaging in less harassment people in streets and distribution arms to PRF halted. Badr intimated he believed PRF under Communist control and stated he had been assured Qassem himself had been convinced Communist since 1935. He agreed situation Iraq strange and obscure.

Asked about work UAS council, Badr said work in progress but organization needs some means converting its energy into forward motion.

Comment: Throughout interview Badr was affable and friendly, though guarded and circumspect in substantive discussion. It was hardly to be expected, in view his past activities and attitudes, that he should be as forthcoming as I found Imam and officials in Taiz; nevertheless a definite degree of thaw was detectible. His protracted stay in Syria with Nasser in existing circumstances may possibly have given him few second thoughts on Soviet bloc aims. Further possibility is that he was given instructions on posture he should adopt in letter to Crown Prince which Qadi Al-Amri entrusted to me on my departure

from

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 2728, March 21, 3 p.m., from Cairo.

from Taiz for delivery to Hasan Bin Ibrahim, which Al-Amri told me was important and "had something to do with us".

HARE

RSP:SLS/2

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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SENT TO: Amembassy, LONDON

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Relat. to 611.86H

3-2159

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Info:

(Code Room: Please repeat Cairo's 2728, March 21, Control 14060 to the
above post).

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611.86H/3-2159

Confidential File

611.86H

3-2159

Drafted by *WLE*
NEA:NE:WLEagleton:fn 3/24/59

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NE - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

S/S-CR

MAR 24 1959 P.M.

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FROM: Cairo
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2740, March 22, Noon

Control: 14286
Rec'd: March 23, 1959
7:22 A.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2740, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 281.
London's 4891.

Assuming Department's concurrence agree substance EMBTEL 2695 should be communicated fully to Foreign Office together with EMBTEL 2728 reporting conversation with Badr. Might add that on night prior my departure Taiz I gave British Charge there full account of our mission.

HARE

IMS:RV/8



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FROM: London

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4917, March 23, 7 p.m.

Control: 14675

Rec'd: March 23, 1959
5:46 p.m.

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611.364/3-2359

SENT DEPARTMENT 4917, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO UNNUMBERED

Cairo's 2740

Cairo's 2728 not received. Please repeat.

BARBOUR

DK/2

Note: London was not an addressee of Cairo's 2728. WLB.

CAA

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MAR 24 1959

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G. P.

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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2815, March 28, 1 p.m.

Control: 18122

Rec'd: March 28, 1959
3:21 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2815, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY LONDON
289, ADEN 48, TAIZ 4

NOFORN

Protect source.

Last night Ahmad Al-Shami, Yemeni member UAS Executive Council, told FSO Stookey Prince Badr had spoken to him of information he had received indicating US and UK conspiring together against regime Yemen. To Shami's question "for whose benefit" Badr replied his present information does not indicate, but he expects point will be cleared up in fuller details he has requested from undisclosed source. Badr said if evidence appears reliable he may feel obliged return Yemen immediately, leaving important business undone, such as conferences with Nasser and Beirut meeting Arab Foreign Ministers. Shami went on say leaflets now circulating clandestinely in Yemen attacking him with accusation he plotting with Stookey against GOY. He requested and obtained Badr's permission discuss these matters confidentially with Stookey.

Shami expressed own opinion Communists probably originated plot allegation and was convinced Zubairi's free Yemenis Cairo also involved.

Stookey stated this was first he had heard of allegations US plotting in Yemen and observed theory rumor started by Communists plausible in view their activities on other Arab countries, such as forging documents, in attempt to obstruct current swing Arab opinion and policy away from

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-2- 2815, March 28, 1 p.m., from Cairo

Soviet bloc. He added would not be reasonable for US plot against government with which it making great effort cooperate.

Comment: Embassy so far unable judge whether Badr has been duped by Communist canard or whether he consciously associating self with it for obvious purposes of his own. Would welcome any comment Taiz or Aden can make on possible origin of rumor.

As Ambassador may see Badr again before latter's return Yemen would be helpful have Department's guidance on attitude which may be assumed if this subject comes up in conversation, or for use by legation Taiz.

HARE

SA:FKG/11

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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1959 MAR 29 11 11 AM
1475
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SENT TO: Amembassy, CAIRO

PRIORITY 2905

Rptd. Info: Amembassy, LONDON 8638
AmLegation, TAIZ 13
AmConsul, ADEN 593

Cairo's 2815-61186R/3-2859

In further conversations Badr or Shami you may emphasize US deeply concerned that rumors should be spread indicating in any way US seeking interfere internal affairs Yemen. US gratified at cordial reception Ambassador Hare Taiz and at general indications improvement relations. Elements unfriendly US have in recent months made strong efforts in other countries discredit USG and American activities through spreading false rumors alleging US interference Arab affairs. USG would strongly hope Yemeni leaders, at period when fruitful relationship looms, will not be susceptible such efforts.

You may also stress USG regrets Badr was not present Yemen during Ambassador's visit but earnestly hopes both in Cairo and in Yemen US officials will have opportunity consult closely with him in working out improved and expanded relationship.

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Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DD Newsom:ddn 9/29/59

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA:NE: David D. Newsom

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Rockwell (in draft)

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611.86H/3-2859

611.86H/3-2859

WM

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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14821

SENT TO: Amlegation
~~Amconsul~~ TAIZ 14
Amconsul ADEN 5-95-

611.864/32859

Origin

Info

Re Cairo's 4 to Taiz and 48 to Aden, Department desires receive
soonest copy leaflets circulating in Yemen.

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

RM/R
Anal 47
Rev
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611.864/3-2859

Drafted by: NEA/P:HSims:dh 3/30/59

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA/P - Harold Sims

Clearances:

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MAR 30 1959 A.M.

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37

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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2847, March 30, 7 p.m.

Control: 19062

Rec'd: March 31, 1959
10:02 a.m.SENT DEPARTMENT 2847, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 294,
TAIZ 5, ADEN 49.

DEPTTEL 2905

Today Stookey imparted substance referenced telegram to Shami, who obviously impressed with USG concern on subject. He undertook pass message to Badr, expressing belief latter would be reassured and probably consider matter closed. He felt sure Badr would not have authorized discussion with US if he had fully believed allegations in first place.

Shami stated Badr fears Egyptians conspiring against regime Yemen and his succession to throne, and may have started US-UK plot rumor in order be able point out to Yemenis, in event failure their operation, that they had warned them western plot was brewing, thus shifting blame from selves. After observing Badr seemed deeply disturbed by course events Iraq and manner in which Communists have "unmasked selves" there, Shami commented somewhat wistfully Badr "needs friends".

Source said leaflets mentioned Embassy telegram 2815 produced by free Yemenis in Sudan. Today he had learned material being printed and circulated Aden making same accusations against him.

Shami stated Imam telephoned Badr before dawn this morning instructing him attend Beirut Arab League meeting if Fawzi goes, take strong line against atheist-Communist threat to Islam, propose AL send committee Iraq investigate Communist influence there, and serve himself on such committee.

HARE

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

611.86H/4-359

FROM : **American Embassy CAIRO**

752
DESP. NO.

TO : **THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.**

April 3, 1959
DATE

REF :

9 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	NEA-4	RM/R-2 IRC-8 P-5
	4-6-59	CIA-10 USIA-10

SUBJECT: **Exchange of Telegrams between Ambassador and Imam of Yemen.**

Ambassador Hare sent the following telegram to His Majesty the King of Yemen following his return from his recent visit to Taiz:

"I deeply appreciate Your Majesty's gracious hospitality during my recent visit in Taiz, and I welcome opportunity work toward strengthening ties friendship and cooperation between peoples of Yemen and United States."

On March 29 the following reply was received signed by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen:

"I have been instructed to express to you His Majesty's thanks for your kind telegram. His Majesty and his Government will, with God's aid, work always toward the strengthening of the ties of friendship between the Yemeni people and the people of the United States of America."

For the Ambassador:

Claude G. Ross
Claude G. Ross
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

cc: AmLegation TAIZ

Stookey
POL:RmStookey/jk
REPORTER

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611.86H/4-359

1959 APR 10 AM 10 09

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Department of State

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FROM: Taiz

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 34, April 5, 6 p.m.

Control: 3565
Rec'd: April 7, 1959
1:04 p.m.

001

SENT DEPARTMENT 34, INFORMATION ADEN 19, CAIRO 18

" DEPTTEL 14.

Check various sources Taiz revealed no evidence leaflet distribution in more than month. One source from Sanaa stated same true there.

FERGUSON

SW:RV/8

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RMR

FROM: Taiz

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 97, May 9, 9 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 97, CAIRO 75, ROME 6, ADEN 57

I accompanied by Michael Harritz, contract employee supervising wheat arrival, as interpreter, held one and one-half hour meeting Crown Prince Badr night May 8. At conclusion meeting I completely bewildered outward change attitude toward US on part Badr. Without previous knowledge, meeting would appear have been between two long standing friends who met discuss mutual problems and methods solution. This all marred only by fervent, almost pleading appeal Badr for assistance US in improving relations between two countries and only slightly less fervent appeal economic assistance. Badr appeared humble and either very frightened or thoroughly chastized desperate young man.

Meeting began with exchange appropriate niceties and my expression concerning health Imam but very rapidly got to business. Badr was extremely cordial during entire visit, showing ready wit and relaxed manner at appropriate moments but on specific subjects becoming serious and intent upon making point.

His words throughout were precise and chosen with great care and during his most serious moments delivered in slow and deliberate manner. The Crown Prince gives impression being well educated and cultured man. His eyes during conversation reflect varying emotions, ranging from sad to determined and almost cruel, to laughing.

A measure of his preparedness for the meeting can be gained from his reference routine request visas two Department officers scheduled arrive early June. Badr knew their names and

asked

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Control: 5728
Rec'd: May 9, 1959
4 p.m.MESSAGE CENTER
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-2- 97, May 9, 9 p.m., from Taiz

asked concerning their positions. He obviously well briefed before meeting.

At conclusion meeting Badr rose and accompanied almost to door, stopped and summarized discussion re relations saying "we must begin new era our relations. My hands are open, my words sincere. If we work together in friendship and mutual trust we can succeed, but two peoples must be made aware each other. The door in Yemen is open wide to US. Come in."

General despatch follow aid and relations.

FERGUSON

AAL:FKG/11

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**OUTGOING
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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT,
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

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1959 MAY 12 PM 1 26

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SENT TO: AmConsul, ADEN 730

611 864

5-9-59

TS P

(Code Room: Please repeat to the above post Teiz Telegram No
dated May 9, 1959, Control 5727)

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(RM)

DILLON

611.864/5-9-59

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DDNewsom:as. 5/11/59

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

David D. Newsom
NE - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

ear 8/8-CR
MAY 12 1959 P.M.

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RMR

FROM: Taiz

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 98, May 9, 10 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 98, CAIRO 76

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

LEGTEL 97

Control: 5727

Rec'd: May 9, 1959
4:35 p.m.

1959 MAY 11 AM 7 15

MESSAGE CENTER

NEA

It was with rehwoxzbe* relations between US-Arab world and US-Yemen that Crown Prince pulled all stops during May 8 meeting. Here he reached peak of fervency and humility and greatest seriousness. Following general conversation on aid, Badr stated "aid certainly important, but improvement relations and building trust and friendship more important."

He opened with "people in past tried divide us and Arab world and nearly succeeded. Fortunately, they unsuccessful and now true intentions revealed. Seems strange both east and west pledged friendship yet connived against one another. Solution now forget past mistakes and differences, join hands and work together toward new firm relationship based on sincere cooperation."

I queried Badr as to his suggestions on approach toward improvement to relations between governments and peoples. He replied spontaneously and with strong feeling, "we need US companies, business agents, anything that will acquaint Yemen sons of street with America. People by seeing Americans and US products, in stores and on roads, will come to understanding. We want any one American who will contribute our economy either directly or indirectly. We want projects and commerce."

Badr appearing in expansive mood I asked his opinion books, magazines and films as means promoting understanding. He

replied

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Date 6/22/59

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611.0611/E-575

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-2- 98, May 9, 10 p.m., from Taiz

replied "I have no objection and am ready cooperate fully". He agreed heartily these and emphasized should teach means improving living standard. I mentioned specifically films on irrigation, medicine and travelogues, ciuing Arabic film on Mosque in Washington. This he expressed desire see.

Turning again to relations he stated "we must exert maximum effort together to recover lost time, beginning from tonight. These words are official and sincere and I am responsible authority. I give you my word that you will have my cooperation, but you too must work diligently." I thanked him and promised do my best but said sure he realized difficulty operating alone. He replied "you have my permission bring assistants but take advantage this opportunity."

Comment: The whole exchange was somewhat unnerving. Here was Crown Prince and regent practically begging for relations, the same man who only three months previously opposed every US effort, employing every delaying tactic. Either he is better actor than Garrick or much of distance separating Badr and US has been bridged. I have no delusions about reasons sudden shift in line, however, whatever his personal reasons, be they instructions or caused through fear own self-preservation and status, fact remains that for moment he evidencing and offering opportunity US partially achieve aims. How long this feeling cooperation will last and whether he would agree when faced with actual request impossible predict; however, is quite likely positive action part USG would prolong atmosphere. As proof USG willingness does becomes known Yemeni people, Badr will be placed in a position whereby it becomes increasingly difficult turn back. For moment, at least, our policies parallel.

FERGUSON

AAL:FKG/11

*As received. Verification upon request.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

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NO.: C-10364, May 29, 1959,

COPY No.....

SUBJECT: OGB Operations Plans for Yemen

TO: ADEN, ADDIS ABABA, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, MOSCOW, ROME

In accordance with the desire of the Operations Coordinating Board to keep posts informed of US policy decisions with respect to their region, the Department transmits herewith a copy of the Operations Plan for Yemen, approved by the Operations Coordinating Board on April 8, 1959. The Plan has been prepared pursuant to

NSC 5820/1.

DILLON (ACTING)

Enclosure:

ADEN copy No. 19
ADDIS ABABA copy No. 22
JIDDA copy No. 23
KHARTOUM copy No. 24
LONDON copy No. 25
MOSCOW copy No. 26
ROME copy No. 27

PM/R
Anal. 16
Rec.
Dist.

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(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY:

NEA: NE: DDNewsom: 5/28/59

APPROVED BY:

NE - David D. Newsom

CLEARANCES:

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611.834/5-2859

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MAY 29 1959 P.M.

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611.864/5-2959
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Department of State

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Action

Control: 1073
Rec'd: June 2, 1959
5:46 a.m.

NEA
Info

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

SS
SP

NO: 134, June 1, 4 p.m.

RME

SENT DEPARTMENT 134, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 114.

Qadi Ibrahim Hachrani informed Legation June 1 telegram received from Badr in Sanaa requesting see me there as soon as possible. Trip arrangements being made soonest.

FERGUSON

RE:ATB/L

611.86H/6-159

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1959 JUN 2 PM 12 05

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JUL 15 1959

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Box: 2657

(21)
1/2/5

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Date 1 June 1959
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To FERGUSON

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- ☒ Security-Classified Information
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NND 597 428
Authority

5/8/90
Date J.Y.G.

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

919

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(Security Classification)

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NO.: CA-377 July 13, 1959

COPY NO. 1

SUBJECT: Additional Distribution of JCB Operations Plans

TO: The American Embassy, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV

The Department is making certain additional distribution to your post of JCB Operations Plans concerning countries in the Near East. Accordingly one copy of the Operations Plans for Yemen is attached hereto.

DILLON, ACTING

Enclosure:

Operations Plans for Yemen, April 15, 1959.

Copy No. 27 of 41 - Amman
Copy No. 38 of 41 - Beirut
Copy No. 39 of 41 - Tel Aviv



S/S-CR
JUL 13 1959 A.M.
JUL 13 1959

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(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY: NBA:NE:DDNewsom:as 7/8/59

APPROVED BY: ME - David D. Newsom

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AmLegation, TAIZ

27
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : Leg Despatch No. 26 dated August 8, 1959

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	IN F O OTHER

SUBJECT: Reported Position Qadi Mohammed esh-Shami with Regard to US Policy in Yemen

During a conversation with Sheikh Salem ER-RAMDAH August 7, 1959, concerning the upcoming trip to Beida (see referenced LegDesp), Sheikh Salem recounted a conversation with Qadi Mohammed ESH-SHAMI the previous night. Esh-Shami, during that conversation, reportedly expressed in great detail to Sheikh Salem his views on GOV-US cooperation.

Esh-Shami was stated to have said that he feels that the future of Yemen is in the hands of the United States. The Yemen knows the Soviet Union and China and recognizes that the loans that they have extended to the Yemen have not been extended for humanitarian purposes; instead, esh-Shami is reported to have said, they have been extended in order to have an excuse to penetrate the country politically and to undermine the existing system. Similarly, esh-Shami is supposed to have said, France and Great Britain can not be trusted, pointing to Algeria, Egypt and Suez and the troubles over the Protectorate-Yemen border. Except for an unfortunate situation with regard to Israel, esh-Shami reputedly said, the United States has no mark against her record. She is known to have extended aid to many countries of the world without interference in internal affairs and to have helped less fortunate countries in a time of need.

Sheikh Salem then stated that esh-Shami wished to apologize for not having seen the reporting officer more often over the past four months and to assure him that the United States had his (esh-Shami's) full support in what it was attempting to accomplish in Yemen. Further, esh-Shami is supposed to have asked that his apologies be accepted for not personally accompanying the reporting officer on the trip to Beida and that his age, approximately 83, and the arrival of the IMAM during that period be accepted as the reasons. Sheikh Salem then said that esh-Shami had privately told him that he wished to speak with the Imam immediately upon his arrival and to explain what had been done in his absence, this before disruptive elements reached him. The Crown Prince, according to Sheikh Salem, is concerned over the reaction of his father to the aid agreement and other evidences of US progress.

Sheikh Salem stated that Qadi Mohammed had assured the Crown Prince that he would justify every action to the Imam and that he would defend his (BADR'S) actions toward the United States. Esh-Shami then discussed with Badr closer cooperation with the United States and, according to Sheikh Salem, obtained Badr's concurrence in this. Through Sheikh Salem, and personally during previous conversations, esh-Shami has offered his full cooperation in all matters. He has freely expressed his dislike, both to the reporting officer and to others who have

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From AmLegation, TAIZ

repeated his comments, of both the Soviets and Chicom.

Finally, Sheikh Salem brought an invitation from Qadi Mohammed for the reporting officer to visit Marib and Harib soon after returning from Beida, the latter in order to examine another portion of the border and to study the problems in that area.

COMMENT: The opportunity to visit the areas and Beida as the representative of a foreign power are important in themselves; for, insofar as can be determined, this is a privilege not previously extended to a foreign diplomat. Esh-Shami, because of his position, is a man who can provide a powerful assist to the United States in its efforts in Yemen.

Charles E. Ferguson
Charles E. Ferguson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

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AmConsulate, ADEN.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: August 10, 1959

SUBJECT: Courtesy Call by Ambassador Hare on Yemeni Charge d'Affaires Zabarah

PARTICIPANTS: Sayyid Ahmad Zabarah, Yemeni Charge d'Affaires

Raymond A. Hare, American Ambassador to the UAR and Minister to Yemen

William R. Crawford, Jr., NE

COPIES TO: NEA (1cc), NE(2cc), NE/E(1cc), E(1cc), ICA(1cc), AmLegation, TAIZ
AmEmbassy, CAIRO(1cc)

Ambassador Hare said that he welcomed the opportunity of calling on Sayyid Zabarah before returning to the Middle East. He had been gratified to learn that His Majesty the Imam had made a speedy recovery in Rome and was now on his way back to Yemen, and hoped that Sayyid Zabarah would convey his best wishes both to His Majesty and to His Highness, Crown Prince Badr. The Ambassador said that he had been on leave for some weeks and asked Sayyid Zabarah to bring him up to date on recent developments in United States - Yemeni relations.

Sayyid Zabarah stated that he would be pleased to convey the Ambassador's greetings to the Imam and to the Crown Prince. In regard to Yemeni - United States relations, the major development of the past several weeks had been the approval of the basic economic aid agreement between the two countries. The Yemeni Government's concurrence had apparently been announced by Radio Sana'a on August 5. This was a very important step, and he hoped that the United States would take advantage of the conclusion of this agreement to move forward rapidly on aid projects in Yemen. It might take the Yemeni Government a long time to make up its mind, but once it had done so, it would expect "miracles". This was particularly the case in regard to

American economic

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American economic aid, since the Yemenis viewed the United States as the most efficient nation on earth and were badly in need of its help.

Mr. Crawford noted that in response to Yemeni requests and prior to the approval of the basic aid agreement, the United States had sent engineers to survey the Taiz-Sana'a road. A coffee technician was on his way to the country, and consideration was being given to providing the services of an agricultural-irrigation technician. Mr. Workinger, the senior ICA official assigned to the Yemen, was now in Washington on consultation and would be returning to Taiz within about two weeks for discussion with the Yemeni Government of other specific projects to be undertaken under the basic agreement. This was aside from the famine aid program already well under way.

Sayyid Zabarah said that in relation to the famine aid program he hoped American assistance in distribution was permitting wheat accumulated along the coast to be moved promptly inland. There was a great need for this wheat in the mountainous areas and, in addition, if large quantities were left at the mercy of the elements at the ports, the wheat might spoil. This could turn the recipients against the giver and confirm stories spread in certain quarters that the American wheat and flour were of poor quality.

Mr. Crawford replied that according to all recent reports, wheat was now moving inland at a satisfactory rate under the terms of a trucking contract financed by the United States. He could testify from personal experience that the propaganda stories seeking to deride the quality of the American wheat sent to Yemen were disbelieved as soon as individuals actually saw the wheat for themselves.

Ambassador Hare said that he was pleased to learn that the basic aid agreement with Yemen had apparently been approved and that progress was already being made in certain aspects of the program. Having himself participated in the early phases of negotiation of the economic aid agreement some eight years ago, he would acknowledge that the pattern of cooperation between Yemen and the United States in regard to economic assistance had taken a long time to evolve. He hoped that in the long run, however, it was such cooperation carefully developed that would prove the most beneficial to both parties.

Approved in draft - Raymond A. Hare

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amlegation, TAIZ

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : -

80
DESP. NO.

October 12, 1959

DATE

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	IN F O OTHER

SUBJECT: Prospects of US Retaining the Initiative in Yemen

SUMMARY

The reporting officer has begun to have grave doubts about the likelihood of the United States retaining the position it has reached in the Yemen and even greater reservation about the possibility of advancing that position. This is not to say that there has thus far been any noticeable change in the attitude of the GOY, rather it is to point out that in the opinion of the reporting officer US-Yemen relations have reached a critical stage. US actions during the next two or three months will determine the trend of Yemeni politics for some period in the future, certainly during the life of the Imam.

As is well known, there is an inherent distrust by the Imam and his advisors to all foreigners, whether he has somewhat altered his views as a result of the recent trip to Italy for medical treatment and has come to have a greater appreciation of things is difficult to say; although some reports indicates this. The same reports state that many of the close advisors of the Imam have been similarly effected; however, the validity of this can not be confirmed.

I. Brief History of US Efforts to 1958:

It was not through any history of long and happy association with the outside world that the Imam finally decided to open the country; instead, this significant move was brought about by economic necessity and, in the final analysis, through the efforts of the Crown Prince. The Italians were the first to enjoy a position of influence in the country; however, they have not been able to provide the economic assistance needed by the GOY and have restricted themselves to providing doctors and other technicians and to undertaking development of certain phases of the country, primarily on a commercial basis.

Numerous efforts have been made in the past to create the atmosphere conducive to the introduction of US private capital and government aid into the Yemen; but, until the present period, these efforts have been in vain. The experiences of the GOY with the Yemen Development Corporation colored developments for the past few years in the commercial field; and efforts to implement an assistance program were equally unsuccessful, partially as a result of misunderstandings on the part of both parties, partially by personality clashes and partially as a result of the suspicion of the Yemenis that US aid is dependent upon the acceptance of stringent political strings. This, in brief was the history of US efforts up to the end of 1958.

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From Amlegation, TAIZ

II. Entrance of Communist Bloc into Yemen:

In the meantime, the communist bloc countries were pushing their position with considerable success. Their entrance into Yemen came about as a result of the combination of Badr's fancied or actual poor reception in London in December, 1957, where he went ostensibly for the purpose of participating in talks on the political differences between Britain and Yemen, injured feelings over the treatment given him when he visited France and West Germany following the London visit and the red-carpet treatment accorded him by the communist countries during the final stage of his trip.

Further, although the Russians and ChiComs offered a loan rather than outright economic assistance, this appeared more attractive to the Imam than did the earlier offer made by the Richard's Mission, which he understood to be a one-shot deal rather than the initial commitment for aid. Following the return of Badr, the Imam, faced with an economic crisis, the feeling that the west would not assist him, the realization that he must turn to the outside for assistance if he were to continue to exist in the modern world and the glowing accounts of the Crown Prince over the treatment accorded him by the communists and their generous offers, gave his reluctant approval.

Russians and Chinese, together with a sprinkling of East Germans and Czechs, poured into the country; and today there are an estimated 850 Chinese communists working on the Hodeida-Sanaa road and possibly 100-125 Russians engaged in the construction of a new port at Hodeida. Although work has progressed reasonably well, in view of the short period of time that the projects have been underway and the many difficulties involved in operations in Yemen, there is reason to believe that the results have not been wholly pleasing to the Imam. Whether this reported dissatisfaction is directed at the work or is a result of the political activity of the two groups is difficult to ascertain. The fact remains that there have been many disagreements reported between the GOY and the communists.

III. US Efforts since 1958:

By the end of 1958, Yemen was faced with a serious shortage of grain as a result of a prolonged drought. Efforts made at that time by the American Consuls in Aden were successful, and the Imam agreed to accept a gift of Title II wheat, later expanded to include flour, from the United States. Prior to and during the same period, efforts being made again from the AmConsulate, Aden, to secure approval for the establishment of an American Legation in Taiz were rewarded by approval from the Imam for the US Government to lease a building in Taiz, which would be used both as an office building and as a residence.

As disenchantment grew with the performance of the Russian and Chinese, be it for political or other reasons, the position of the west improved; and, the Imam apparently decided to take another chance on cooperation with the west. This led to the undertaking of negotiations for the conclusion of a Basic Aid Agreement between the US and Yemen and to the planning of an aid program for the country.

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From Amlegation,TAIZ

In the meantime, as a result of an official request from the Crown Prince, it was agreed that a Bureau of Public Roads Survey team would be sent to Yemen to study the Taiz-Sanaa road, with a view toward undertaking a road improvement program. This has been accomplished, and the members of the team have returned to their respective posts, with the leader of the team, James Cheatham, going to Washington to prepare the final report.

Negotiations for the Basic Aid Agreement led to verbal agreement with the GOY representatives designated by the Crown Prince, who was ruling as regent during the absence of the Imam in Italy, and to the submission of a note to the Crown Prince, in his capacity as Foreign Minister. A reply note was promptly received stating that the US offer was accepted subject to a number of conditions. This reply was, on August 8, 1959, transmitted to the Department of State. The reply from Washington is now being awaited.

A further facet of the US efforts in Yemen was the approval of the US Government for making available to the GOY two separate sums of money to be used to cover the cost of transporting the Title II wheat and flour from the Red Sea ports to the inland distribution centers. The initial contract was concluded with a group of Yemeni businessmen and resulted in a reasonably satisfactory performance. When the time came for the conclusion of the second contract, the Imam, who had returned from Italy, decided that, for one reason or another, the first group was no longer acceptable. As a result, he proposed a new man for the work, this after approval had been obtained by the ICA Representative in Yemen for an extension of the original contract. This resulted in additional delays while further instructions were received from Washington, and, it is in this stage that the matter now rests.

IV. Present Financial Crisis and Resulting Political Implications:

There is little doubt but that the people of Yemen are favorably inclined toward the west, nor is there any reason to doubt that the Imam would, at the present moment, prefer Western assistance to that from the Eastern Bloc. The country is, however, faced with an increasingly serious financial crisis, the exact seriousness of which is difficult to determine. There are no government records to which one can turn, a great reluctance on the part of the Yemeni Government officials to discuss the problem in other than the most general of terms and no budget that could be used as a beginning point for the preparation of estimates. There are, however, numerous outward indications of the difficulties (Legtel 84) that have been confirmed from many sources.

This problem has been examined individually and collectively by the western representatives in Yemen, with a view toward analyzing the situation and arriving at a possible solution that could be proposed to their respective governments. Although undoubtedly the Imam would prefer a loan, there are many reasons why this would be unwise. The only answer seems to be the rapid implementation of the US aid program.

The justification for early implementation of economic assistance from the political viewpoint as it involves the US, goes well beyond the fact of a financial crisis and points to a strong recommendation that every effort be made to implement immediately the assistance program, or at least some portion of it as

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Desp. No. 80
From Amlegation, TAIZ
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tangible evidence of good faith. Failing such action, the Imam, under/pressure resulting from the economic crisis, might again decide that it is useless to undertake to do business with the US and turn 180 degrees. The Eastern Bloc has been working diligently, although quietly, and is strongly rumored prepared to offer Yemen an assistance program of \$60,000,000 (LegDesp 77). The British Charge is of the opinion that the offer has already been presented to the Imam and that he is postponing action pending evidence of action, or lack of, on the part of the west. If they select the proper moment, when the Imam feels that he has no further hope of cooperation with the US, the resulting setback would have far-reaching and lasting effects.

V. Difficulties of Operations in Yemen:

The problems of the US in a country like Yemen are many; however, they come, although not equally, from both sides. First, Yemen has a government based on the whims of one man, the Imam; and decisions depend, to some extent, on how he is feeling and who was the last person with whom he spoke. Second, the Imam, being unfamiliar with the operations of a modern, but complex, government, is unused to waiting for replies; although, he has no compunction about delaying his replied to requests from foreign governments.

Third, organization and detail have no place in the thinking of the Imam, or for that matter of the vast majority of the officials of the government. He expects that when something has been agreed upon the action will be immediately forthcoming. Fourth, there still remains an influential body of persons in Yemen who incline toward cooperation with the East and who seize every opportunity to criticize the US for its slowness of action, insistence on detail and lack of flexibility. Whether the Crown Prince is now actively opposing cooperation with the West is difficult to determine; however, his close followers have certainly not come as far as he has.

Both the Imam and the public are demanding some action, soon. The longer the implementation of some portion of the program is postponed, the greater the possibility that the Imam's patience will end and hope of a program at all be dissipated. The people themselves, suffering from unemployment, high prices, disillusionment with the future of Yemen and long-standing poor government will, within a short time, start grumbling. When this happens, the Imam will be flooded with telegrams asking that he intercede with the US to get something started. This can only aggravate his frustration and hasten his impetuous action.

Assuming an aid program is actually begun, the way is not going to be easy. The ~~Yemenis~~ do not understand complicated, to them, agreements and rapidly lose patience during protracted negotiations. They fail entirely to understand the legal terminology employed and feel that the insistence of the US for inclusion of what to them appear to be minute points of detail, is proof of the suspicions that they have long harbored concerning the strings the US attaches to aid. In such negotiations, logic fails, tempers fray and misunderstandings are unavoidable. Even if the point of negotiation of program agreements is reached, the possibility still remains that assistance will finally be refused.

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From Amlegation, TAIZ

The Russians and Chinese have definitely proved themselves more flexible and to have a better understanding of dealing with the Yemenis, a fact that is repeatedly thrown in the face of Western representatives by GOY officials. Examples of this are the ChiCom wheat transport contract negotiated with the same person proposed by the Imam to handle the American contract and the agreements for the Hodeida Port Project and the Hodeida-Sanaa road project. These latter two agreements have never been seen by the reporting officer; however, numerous reports have been received indicating that they are extremely short and simple.

VI. Conclusion:

In summary, it is the opinion of the reporting officer that while the people and the Imam strongly prefer dealing with the West, there is a strong possibility that delays on the part of the West, inflexibility, insistence on detail, misunderstandings and the lack of organization in the Yemeni Government and the impulsiveness of the Imam will, together with the economic crisis in Yemen, result in an about face in Yemen foreign relations and a failure to finally conclude and implement the US assistance program. The door is still open and final success possible; however, the situation can rapidly change unless there is prompt and decisive action on the part of the United States Government.

The situation is actually a rather simple thing to analyze; although the personalities and interrelationships are complex:

1. The country is in the midst of a financial crisis and urgently needs assistance in some form from outside.
2. The Imam would prefer to do business with the West.
3. The people are more favorably inclined toward the West; although it must be remembered that they have little use and considerable suspicion for all foreigners.
4. The, in the terms of the British Charge, "distance that the West has to go" is considerably less than that for the communists because of the above factors. It is not necessary that the United States and the West compete financially with the communists or buy off the present projects of the Eastern Bloc. Much less than this would satisfy the Imam's personal feelings and, at the same time, satisfy the present needs of the country.
5. The Italians, although enjoying a favorable position in Yemen, have not the financial capacity to assist.
6. The British, afflicted with the problem of the Aden Protectorate, are politically unable to offer assistance.

Charles B. Ferguson
Charles B. Ferguson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amlegation, TAIZ

90

DESP. NO.

October 27, 1959

DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF :

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D. 10/31	DEPT. IN F O	OTHER 10/31
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SUBJECT:

Problem of Obtaining Visas for United States Government Employees

Following the signing of the Wheat Transportation Contract on October 26, 1959, the reporting officer again raised the question of the delay on the part of the Government of Yemen in issuing visas to American Government employees being sent to assist in the ICA operations in Yemen.

Sayyid Abdul Rahman ABU TALEB reviewed the situation and stated that all requests for visas were forwarded to His Majesty promptly with a recommendation that authorization for the issuance of the required visa be given immediately. Thus far there has been no authorization forthcoming, despite repeated telegrams to the Imam from the Ministry. One reply was received during the course of the negotiations over the Wheat Transportation Contract. In this, His Majesty, who was unquestionably angered by the delay, stated that under the circumstances he could not see that "their presence would serve any useful purpose".

Now that the contract difficulty has been resolved, Abu Taleb feels that he will be able to obtain the necessary approval and has sent a telegram to His Majesty pointing out that these persons are urgently needed by ICA and are coming to assist in the development of the country. In the meantime, there is little that can be done by either the Legation or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for admission to the country without the express permission of either the Imam or the Crown Prince is impossible. This is not to say that visas are not occasionally issued by GOY representatives outside the country and without reference to one of the above; however, the instances of this are rare.

Persons for whom the Legation has been requested by ICA to facilitate visas are as follows:

Name	Date of Note
Dallas Ostergaard	October 6, 1959
Arthur W. Bechtel	October 15, 1959
James L. Bridges	October 22, 1959
Esther M. Johnstone	October 15, 1959

COMMENT: The reporting officer wishes to stress that the days of entering Yemen through Aden without a visa and without any reaction by the Government of Yemen are over. It is still possible to get a car pass that will permit the passengers to enter; however, within a matter of a couple of hours the Ministry will call the Legation to ask who approved the issuance of a visa and to express displeasure over

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Desp. No. 90

From Amlegation, TAIZ

such unorthodox methods. Further, with the increase in the number of Americans entering Yemen, it would appear to be in the interests of long-range United States-Yemeni relations to comply fully with the laws of the host government.

The Legation also cautions against arrival of personnel at the Taiz airport without a visa, expecting that arrangements can be made with the Foreign Ministry for on-the-spot issuance. This places the Ministry officials in a difficult position. They wish to be cooperative with the Legation but, at the same time, are under instructions not to authorize such entry.

Charles B. Ferguson
Charles B. Ferguson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amlegation, TAIZ

101
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

November 5, 1959

REF : LegDespatch No. 90 dated October 27, 1959

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION REC'D 11/16	DEPT. IN F O	OTHER 11/16
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SUBJECT: Problem of Obtaining Visas in Yemen

A continued lack of reply to the Legation's Notes of October 11, 22 and 31 and to innumerable personal appeals for action on the requests for visas for Arthur W. Bechtel, James L. Bridges, Esther Johnstone and Harriet Workinger, wife of Ralph Workinger, Acting ICA Representative, Yemen, caused the reporting officer to call at his own request on Sayyid Abdul Rahman ABU TALEB, Acting Vice Minister, November 4, in but one additional effort to obtain some positive action.

The reporting officer fully reviewed the history of the problem of obtaining visas for Yemen, citing the difficulty experienced when efforts were made to secure visas for ICA Lebanese contract employees; Nashef and Bawarshi, the interminable wait for the visas for the engineers sent to study the Taiz-Sanaa road and finally outlining the present problem. Abu Taleb expressed personal concern over the delay and stated that he had sent numerous clear telegrams and two coded telegrams to His Majesty in an effort to break the deadlock and the hope the United States Government would understand the problem.

To this the reporting officer replied that as a matter of fact the delay was not understood and that a continuation of the present situation could well lead to further misunderstandings and difficulties. Further, it was stated that with all the appeals to the United States for cooperation and evidence of good faith, this during the negotiations of the wheat transportation contract, it would seem that the time had come for similar expressions from the Government of Yemen. The reporting officer continued that the present delays, which are unexplainable in view of the fact that the Title II program and wheat transportation contract provide for the presence of US observers in the country and the expressed desire of the GOY that the present undertaking be a joint effort.

Finally, the reporting officer suggested as evidence that His Majesty was not being kept fully informed, the imposed separation of Mr. and Mrs. Workinger, which is not in accord with the precepts of Islam and the traditional hospitality of the Yemen.

Abu Taleb answered that he deeply regretted the delays and was at a complete loss to explain why no answer has been forthcoming. He then drafted another telegram to His Majesty requesting prompt action. The reporting officer next raised the question of how the 150 Russians and approximately 800-850 Chinese engineers were able to go and come, apparently at will, and the source from which they obtained their visas. Abu Taleb replied that he did not know the source of the

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Desp. No. 104

From Amlegation, TAIZ

visas, but they were not obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiz.

Abu Taleb's final remark was a question as to what could be done to break the impasse that appears to have developed. The reporting officer suggested that either an arrangement should be made for him to see the Imam or that Abu Taleb should go. This was prompted by the complete failure of the normal means of communications.

COMMENT: The reporting officer, while quite possibly out of line in making as pointed a presentation as he did, has devoted a disproportionate amount of his time during the past eight months to the question of visas and feels that he has virtually exhausted all normal approaches to the subject. Abu Taleb was somewhat disturbed by the conversation; however, the reporting officer feels that the demands on his time, the criticism of the Legation's efforts occasioned by the justified dissatisfaction of ICA personnel in Yemen, the possibility that these delays can have an undesirable effect on efforts to improve relations and the possibility of criticism from the Department and ICA of the efforts of the post in this matter, made such an approach appropriate.

Charles B. Ferguson
Charles B. Ferguson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amlegation, TAIZ
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
REF : LegDespatch Nos. 90, 104 and 108, 111

119

DESP. NO.

COPY NO. 1

SERIES A

November 12, 1959

DATE NOV 16 1959

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 2 PAGES

1 OF 5 COPIES. SERIES A

For Dept.	ACTION 2	DEPT.
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SUBJECT: Evidence of a Major Policy Decision by the GOY

There are numerous positive indications that the Government of Yemen circles has been, during the past two weeks, in the throes of an internal crisis. Proof has come from such sources as Sayyid Abdul Rahman ABU TALEB, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; Sayyid Abdul KARIM el-WAZIR, Acting Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Sayyid Ahmed ABBAS, father-in-law of the Imam; Sheikh Nur ed-DIN ISHAQ, hanger-on at the palace whose daughter is a member of the Imam's harem; Sheikh Mohamed ALI UTHMAN, Minister of Health; Sheikh Salem er-RAMMAH, Paramount Sheikh of Beida province, and numerous other sources available to the Legation.

The crisis was brought about by a build-up during the six weeks of outstanding requests from the Legation for visas, for approval of Ralph WORKINGER as ICA Representative, Yemen, and for signing of the Basic Aid Agreement. In addition the informal British request for a visit to Taiz by Governor LUCE of Aden and the negotiations of W. Angie SMITH, III, President, American Overseas Investment Corporation, added to the pressure. The key to all of these was a decision concerning future GOY policy towards the West.

Numerous long, and frequently bitter, discussions were held in Sukhne, where the Imam is currently in residence, as to what action should be taken with regard to the above. The Imam, himself leaned toward full cooperation; however, numerous of the Ulama and other close advisors preached caution and a continuing policy of limited cooperation with foreign powers. The Crown Prince, on November 2, made a special trip to Sukhne from Taiz, and, from reports, urged that the Imam go completely with the West, particularly the US. Still the delays continued; although the reporting officer was receiving telegrams virtually daily from the Imam, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offering possible solutions to the impasse over the Basic Aid Agreement, requesting films, reporting on the deteriorating financial condition, etc.

The reporting officer spent an average of an hour a day with Sayyid Abdul Rahman Abu Taleb during the ten days preceding his trip to Sukhne on November 7. Daily discussions were held on the Basic Aid Agreement, the visas and the approval of Workinger. These discussions reached a climax in the meeting of November 4 (Legdespatch Nos. 90, 104 and 108), at which time the reporting officer assigned the three major problems to Sayyid Abdul Rahman and requested that he go personally to Sukhne to obtain a decision, emphasizing that there was no possibility of settling the matter through endless telegrams to the Imam.

ChasBFerguson:abf

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Desp. No. 119

From Amlegation, TAIZ

Sayyid Abdul Rahman returned November 8 and reported on November 9 that the meeting in Sukhne lasted until 1:00 a.m. the morning of the 8th and that during the meeting all the outstanding problems with the West were tabled for discussion, with the answer to each one depending on the decision that was made concerning the whole. After having listened throughout the meeting to the various arguments, the Imam gave his decision and stated that he would issue instructions accordingly. This ended the debate, and each of the participants immediately stated that he agreed with the Imam's decree.

When Abu Taleb returned to Taiz he was met at the airport by BADR, who had grown impatient of waiting for information concerning the time of Abu Taleb's return and, after three calls to the Director of Aviation, Ghaleb JARMOUZI, went personally to await him. When Abu Taleb descended from the plane, Badr took his arm; and the two of them paced the runway while a full briefing was given.

Abu Taleb, and other official and unofficial sources, interpret the latest development as a significant decision in favor of the West and an indication of the direction that the policy of the GOY can be expected to take. They cite, as proof of this interpretation, that everything outstanding with the US has been "settled" and the Governor of Aden given the go-ahead on his proposed informal visit, with a state dinner ordered.

Most Legation sources expect a reaction, with attacks on them personally, by the proponents of a closed door policy and by the supporters of other "groups"; however they state this is not an unusual development following a "major decision" of this type. These same sources, including the Crown Prince and Abu Taleb, assert that "our friends will rejoice and our enemies are no longer important".

COMMENT: The reporting officer, who was acutely aware of the increased tenseness developing in the Foreign Office during this period and of the efforts being made by Abu Taleb and others, is inclined to agree that, at least for the time being, the GOY has turned the corner and has made a firm decision.

The reporting officer also feels that this turn places greatly increased pressure on the west, particularly the United States, and that some prompt action should be taken to implement the assistance program, particularly the road project. This will afford the supporters of the west evidence of the "success of the new policy". Abu Taleb, and others, frankly state that they, as well as the Crown Prince and the Imam are now "squarely on the spot" to prove the wisdom of the decision to go with the west. Further, the reporting officer has been the recipient of an increased number of pleas from GOY officials to get something started with the minimum of delay.

Charles B. Ferguson
Charles B. Ferguson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

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Control: 1349

Rec'd: December 2, 1959
10:42 a.m.

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1695, December 1, 2 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1695, REPEATED INFORMATION TAIZ 15, ADEN 14.

In response cabled instructions from Imam, Hassan Bin Ibrahim, Deputy Imam Yemen, called on Ambassador to express Imam's concern Ferguson's resignation and to request his tenure be continued. While agreeing pass message to Department, Ambassador explained virtual impossibility reversal this stage and stressed fact Ferguson resigning personal reasons. Bin Ibrahim will so inform Imam, hoping allay his concern by Ambassador's assurances that resignation not decision taken by Department to remove Ferguson, or result Ferguson's feeling toward Yemen, but was for purely personal reasons; that Department cognizant importance of Yemen and exerting every effort find suitable replacement whose ability and qualifications will prove equally acceptable to Imam.

Embassy considers this approach by Imam considerable tribute to Ferguson's efforts and suggests that reply from Department would prove useful as courteous gesture even though probably little to be added to what already told Bin Ibrahim.

HARE

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RPTD: AmConsul, ADEN

Embtel 1695

611.864/12-159
Note 123. Ferguson,
Charles B.

Yemeni Charge Dec 3 informed Hart of Imam's appreciation Ferguson's work Yemen, his concern over resignation and request assignment be continued.

Asking that our reply be conveyed Imam, Hart stated that while Dept also deeply appreciative Ferguson's contribution US-Yemen relations, he had resigned for purely personal reasons and resignation not in any way to be interpreted as change in U.S. desire to be friendly and helpful to GOY. Urgent consideration was being given to choice successor and in interim Stoltzfus assuming charge Legation.

Cairo authorized draw on foregoing in furnishing reply from Dept to Ibn Ibrahim.

Taiz authorized use foregoing as appropriate.

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Harter

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Cat <i>[initials]</i>

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:WRCrawford Jr:lc 12/4/59

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Parker T. Hart

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Brewer (draft) *WRC*

607/ S/S CR

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AmConsul, ADEN

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NOTE 123

HARE

RAYMOND A.

Hart-Ambassador Letter December 1

Dept would welcome your views re possibility your making farewell call on Imam of Yemen. We inclined believe that brief visit, perhaps utilizing attache aircraft, would be of considerable value at this apparently critical transition phase in our relations with Yemen (change-over in U.S. representation Taiz, signature basic economic aid agreement, private oil and mineral concessions). At same time we aware difficulties which inevitably attend such visits and already extensive demands on limited time before your departure Cairo.

Harter

HERTEP



Drafted by:

NEA:NE:WRCrawford:am 12/2/59

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NEA - Parker T. Hart

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 2, 1959

SUBJECT: 1. Resignation of US Charge d'Affaires, Taiz
2. "Red Line Agreement"; and
3. Yemen Development Corporation

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Ahmad Ali Zabarah, Charge d'Affaires, Legation of Yemen
NTA - Mr. Parker T. Hart
NT - Mr. William L. Crawford, Jr.

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1. Mr. Zabarah said that he had been instructed by the Imam to take up with the Department the resignation of Mr. Charles Ferguson as US Charge d'Affaires in Yemen. The Imam was greatly disturbed at this development. He regarded Mr. Ferguson as a person of sincerity and balance who had done much to improve US-Yemen relations, and he hoped that Mr. Ferguson's assignment could be extended.

Mr. Hart replied that the Department was also highly appreciative of the contribution which Mr. Ferguson had made to US-Yemeni relations. He wished to stress that the Department had had no role in Mr. Ferguson's resignation from the Foreign Service, which had been for purely personal reasons. However, the resignation had now been accepted and the Department could not compel Mr. Ferguson to remain in his present position. Urgent consideration was being given to the selection of an equally qualified successor. Pending a final selection, Mr. William A. Stoltzfus, Jr., would serve as Charge d'Affaires ad interim. Mr. Hart said that he hoped the Department's reply would be conveyed to the Imam.

2. Mr. Hart said that he wished to comment on two matters mentioned by Mr. Zabarah in his visit to the Department on November 23. Mr. Zabarah had mentioned the so called "Red Line Agreement" as a possible cause of the lack of interest shown by major American oil companies in obtaining a concession in

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Yemen. The Department had studied this question and prepared a brief summary of the history of the "Red Line Agreement" for Mr. Zabarah. This showed conclusively that the Agreement was now a dead letter.

3. Mr. Hart commented that at his earlier meeting with Mr. Zabarah the latter had also requested the Department to consider whether a further approach to the Directors of the Yemen Development Corporation, to induce them to meet the Corporation's financial obligations to the Yemeni Government, might be possible. Since the Department's inquiry showed that the Yemen Development Corporation had ceased to exist, a recourse to legal advice and possible court action would appear to be the only practical means of seeking a settlement.

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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1760, December 7, 2 p.m.

DEPTEL 2258

Would have been glad undertake trip Yemen if time permitted; in fact, would have regarded such visit on completion my tour as virtually mandatory in more normal circumstances. However, situation is that plans finalized for departure December 18 in order arrive in Department by stipulated date and intervening time completely pre-empted by appointments incidental to departure. In circumstances, regret inability proceed Yemen.

HARE

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AmLegation, TAIZ

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Deptel 2258

NOTE 123

HARE
RAYMOND
A.

Should Prince Abdul Rahman and party transit Cairo en route Yemen, you may wish arrange meeting with Prince. We believe occasion might provide useful opportunity coordinate arrangements for farewell visit to Imam, should it prove possible for you undertake such visit. Alternatively, you should time not permit Yemen trip, you may wish convey farewell greetings to Imam through Prince, pointing out that you have been called to high position in the Department, that you regret time did not permit farewell call on Imam, that you wish assure him present changes in US representation to Yemen imply no rpt no change in our friendly ~~xxx~~ interest in that country, and that you will be ~~xxx~~ closely following progress Yemen-US relations from vantage your new assignment.

Dept would also be most interested in Prince's comments on results recent trips to Rome, Bonn and particularly USSR.

HERTER

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:WRCrawford:am 12/7/59

Telegraphic transmission and
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NEA - G. Lewis Jones

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Brewer

DEC 8 - 5:55 P.M.

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December 28, 1959

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Ref: Dept Circular 803, Dec 9, 4 p.m.

Legation regrets inform Dept it unable have reply to refcirtel ready by end of year. No indication in post's files that previous Charge made assessment two studies, and present Principal Officer does not feel off-the-cuff answer to important considerations raised in studies would be useful to Dept. Legation will turn its serious attention to CA-1333 at earliest opportunity.

STOLTZEUS

611.8CH/12-2859

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